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Introduction
Death row inmates around the country have challenged the constitutionality of the lethal injection procedures by which they will be executed. This litigation often turns up serious problems, which create a significant risk that the
inmate will suffer an excruciating death in apparent violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.”1 With a few
notable exceptions, however, courts have been reluctant to intervene, explicitly
deferring to state officials responsible for these procedures and upholding the
execution protocols.
Judicial reluctance to strike down states’ lethal injection procedures is
closely tied to judges’ anxieties about issuing an appropriate remedy should
they find a constitutional flaw. Judges’ decisions upholding current procedures,
in other words, often reflect less about those procedures’ safety and more about
the difficulty of identifying a workable remedy. There are, of course, some lethal
injection plaintiffs who are unable to identify plausible dangers.2 In such cases,
judges are justified in upholding state procedures (assuming that the plaintiff
has had access to the relevant records during discovery). But other lawsuits
identify serious flaws, and courts still decline to interfere. Fearful that any remedy would appear to usurp the political branches’ province and exceed judges’
core competence, these courts let remedial concerns color their findings on the
merits.
Several recent cases reflect these remedial anxieties. In the Supreme Court’s
2008 splintered decision in Baze v. Rees, for instance, the three-Justice plurality
explicitly required the lethal injection plaintiff to proffer a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative as part of his affirmative case.3 It, therefore, conditioned
the Eighth Amendment right on the existence of a workable remedy.
The plurality then drew further on remedial concerns, warning that judicial
involvement in states’ lethal injection procedures would “threaten to transform
courts into boards of inquiry charged with determining ‘best practices’ for exe-

1.

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

2.

By “danger,” I mean a condition creating a significant risk of excruciating pain.

3.

Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (plurality opinion).
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cutions.”4 The plurality argued that such a remedy—requiring states to adopt
the “best practice”—would immerse the judiciary in an area best left to the political branches.5 But the plurality overstated the intrusion, ignoring the fact that
a court finding an Eighth Amendment violation need not require the “best
practice.” To the contrary, more modest remedies can cure a lethal injection
procedure’s risks without interfering so much with the state’s prerogative. The
Court, therefore, misconstrued the remedial issue and then used those remedial
concerns to narrow the scope of the underlying Eighth Amendment right.
Lower courts have also cited and misconstrued remedial issues. One court
identified serious flaws in a state’s lethal injection procedure but nevertheless
declined to find a formal violation and issue a remedy because “under the doctrines of comity and separation of powers, the particulars of [a state’s] lethalinjection protocol are and should remain the province of the state’s executive
branch.”6 Even confronted with the state procedure’s manifest problems, the
court’s overriding concern was to “permit Defendants to proceed with Plaintiff’s execution as scheduled.”7 And that court at least did identify serious problems. More often, courts presented with lethal injection cases avoid engaging
with the details of the procedure, explaining instead that the judicial “role is not
to micromanage the executive branch in fulfilling its own duties relating to executions.”8
Remedial concerns then shift the Eighth Amendment’s focus in method-ofexecution cases from the inmate’s risk of pain to the difficulty the state might
have reforming its method. Of course, some attention to remedy is appropriate,
because the words “cruel and unusual” invite a comparative inquiry. Courts,
however, have distorted this remedial inquiry, drawing false assumptions about
remedial options and concluding that any remedy would necessarily be inappropriate. This distortion gives states incentives not to reform broken procedures but instead to argue that doing so would be too cumbersome. It also allows courts to uphold procedures that are not only dangerous but also the
product of serious political process failures undeserving of judicial deference.
Indeed, several states have given little attention to these procedures’ design,
delegated the procedure to unqualified personnel, failed to consult experts,
concealed the details of the procedure from the public, and obdurately refused
to reconsider their practices even as serious problems have come to light.
In giving so much attention to remedial concerns and so much deference to
the political branches, courts are often not distinguishing between disingenuous

4.

Id. at 1531.

5.

Id.

6.

Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 975-76 (N.D. Cal. 2006) [hereinafter
Morales II] (quoting Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1046 (N.D. Cal.
2006) [hereinafter Morales I]).

7.

Id. at 975 (quoting Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1047).

8.

Lightborne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 351 (Fla. 2007).
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suits manufactured to delay the inevitable execution and legitimate complaints
identifying serious flaws with a state’s method of execution. Courts, in other
words, are adopting a blanket deference that makes it more difficult for even the
strongest cases to get a fair hearing. Given some states’ lack of care and transparency in this area, such deference is unwarranted.
Part I of this Article introduces the three-drug lethal injection procedure
used in most states. Specifically, it explains how haphazard practices and untrained, unqualified personnel greatly heighten the risk that the procedure will
cause an excruciating death. It then summarizes the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Baze v. Rees upholding Kentucky’s three-drug protocol.9 Seven different Justices wrote separately in Baze, and no opinion garnered more than three
votes. This Part explores the state of the law in light of this fractured decision.
Part II argues that remedial concerns figure prominently in recent lethal injection decisions, including Baze, and in fact often drive the outcome. Courts
both explicitly and implicitly shape the scope of the Eighth Amendment right
by looking to whether there might be appropriate remedies. In so doing, courts
often incorrectly assume that any remedy would greatly burden the state. The
remedial inquiry, then, is colored by a general reluctance to tell the political
branches what to do, which grows out of more general discomfort with institutional remedies, particularly structural reform injunctions. While most courts
do not explicitly equate lethal injection suits with structural reform litigation,
lethal injection actions do inquire into the structure—the personnel, architecture, and processes—of states’ execution procedures. Accordingly, deep-seated
judicial attitudes about invasive structural injunctions color courts’ approaches
to lethal injection suits.
Part III argues that this judicial reluctance to impose remedies against the
government is misplaced. Many states have not given much thought to the details of their lethal injection procedures. While respect for democracy might be
an appropriate reason for courts to decline to intervene in some instances, it is
not here, where there has been nothing democratic, deliberative, or transparent
about the creation of execution protocols. Quite to the contrary, where states
have delegated responsibility for their procedures to unelected, unqualified execution team members and then concealed the details of that procedure from the
public, judicial interference is entirely appropriate.
Given that judicial intervention is necessary, Part IV argues that viable
lethal injection remedies are more workable and less intrusive than many courts
seem to assume. This Part suggests particular remedies that would help cure an
execution protocol’s difficulties. It then contends that such remedies would be
relatively modest compared with many public law injunctions and would not
unduly burden the political branches. Calls for judicial deference, then, are
overstated in this area.
This Article concludes that some courts have not been sensitive enough to
the distinctions between different types of public law litigation. They have
blindly assumed that any suit seeking an injunction to reform state practices is
9.
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inherently intrusive. Courts should recognize that some injunctions reshaping
public practices can be relatively unintrusive and wholly appropriate. Indeed,
because remedial concerns often figure heavily in courts’ articulation of the
constitutional right itself, it is crucial that judges appreciate these nuances in the
early stages of an action. This appreciation is all the more important in the
lethal injection context as courts address the scope of the Eighth Amendment
right in light of the muddled Baze decision. In failing to account for these factors thus far, some courts have blessed dangerous state practices and surrendered their own constitutional responsibility to oversee the other branches.
I.

An Overview of Lethal Injection
A. The Three-Drug Protocol

Over the past few years, litigation has uncovered numerous flaws in states’
lethal injection procedures.10 Lawyers typically bring these constitutional challenges under the Eighth Amendment, which reads, “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”11 Lethal injection plaintiffs typically do not claim that the death penalty
is unconstitutional or that lethal injection is unconstitutional per se, but rather
that the particular lethal injection procedure administered in a given jurisdiction violates the Eighth Amendment.12
Courts agree that if a method of execution causes excruciating pain or the
significant risk of such pain, it violates the Eighth Amendment whenever a fea10.

An expert anesthesiologist has also identified numerous flaws in the federal lethal
injection procedure, which is the subject of ongoing litigation. See, e.g., Heath
Declaration, Roane v. Gonzales (D.D.C.) (No. 05-2337) [hereinafter Heath Roane
Decl.] (recounting several problems with the federal lethal injection procedure).
Challenges to federal and state procedures present similar factual and legal issues,
although obviously federalism concerns differ. For ease of presentation, this Article refers to the defendants collectively as “states.”

11.

U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence consists of
roughly four categories of cases: (1) the prohibition of certain punishments
deemed to be painful and inhumane; (2) punishments that are unconstitutional
because they are disproportionate to the crimes for which they are imposed; (3)
“death is different” cases, which require special due process rules for death sentences; and (4) inhumane prison conditions cases. Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 Va. L. Rev. 677, 678-79 (2005). This
Article focuses on the first category.

12.

Note that while most method-of-execution challenges arise under the U.S. Constitution, some have been decided under state constitutional law or state statutory
law. See State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 261-62 (Neb. 2008) (holding Nebraska’s
form of electrocution unconstitutional under the Nebraska constitution); Ohio v.
Rivera, No. 04-65940, slip op. at 10 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 10, 2008) (holding
that Ohio’s lethal injection procedure violated a state statute requiring that lethal
injection be completed “quickly and painlessly”).
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sible alternative exists.13 Despite early Supreme Court cases reviewing the constitutionality of various methods of execution,14 the legal standard for such an
Eighth Amendment lethal injection claim was unclear before the Court’s recent
decision in Baze v. Rees and arguably remains unclear today. Nevertheless, although pre-Baze cases sometimes disagreed about the precise legal standard,
parties and courts generally focused on whether a lethal injection procedure
created an unnecessary risk of pain.15 This inquiry is unconcerned with the risk
of unforeseeable accident.16
Lethal injection is the sole or primary method of execution in thirty-six of
the country’s thirty-seven death penalty states and for the federal government.17
13.

See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531-32 (2008) (requiring a substantial risk of
harm and a viable alternative for an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Evans
v. Saar, 412 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524 (D. Md. 2006) (asking “whether an inmate facing
execution has shown that he is subject to an unnecessary risk of unconstitutional
pain or suffering”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cooey v. Taft, 430 F.
Supp. 2d 702, 708 (S.D. Ohio 2006); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974
(N.D. Cal. 2006). The law recognizes and tolerates, however, that “[s]ome risk of
pain is inherent in any method of execution—no matter how humane—if only
from the prospect of error in following the required procedure.” Baze, 128 S. Ct. at
1529.

14.

See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (“The cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt consummation of the sentence cannot, it seems to us, add an
element of cruelty to a subsequent execution.”); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890) (“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death;
but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used
in the Constitution.”); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-37 (1878) (upholding
constitutionality of execution by firing squad); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 102 (1976) (holding that Eighth Amendment bars punishments “incompatible
with the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 430 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing commentary which stated that
“no court would approve any method of implementation of the death sentence
found to involve unnecessary cruelty in light of presently available alternatives”);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (stating that the Eighth Amendment is “progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice”).

15.

See generally Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 880 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (noting
that the Eighth Amendment “forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence” (quoting Resweber, 329 U.S. at 67)); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (same).

16.

Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464; Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1080 (8th Cir. 2007);
Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 687 (9th Cir. 1994).

17.

See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1526-27 & n.1 (2008). Nebraska is the only death penalty state
specifying electrocution as the sole method of execution, but the Nebraska Su-
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The federal government and at least thirty states use the same three-drug sequence.18 The first of these drugs, thiopental (otherwise known as sodium pentothal), is an ultra-short-acting barbiturate anesthetic. The second drug, pancuronium bromide (Pavulon), is a paralytic that inhibits muscle movement,
including that of the diaphragm. The third drug, potassium chloride, induces
cardiac arrest.19
It is undisputed that if a full dose of thiopental is successfully delivered to
the inmate’s veins, that inmate will be fully anesthetized within two-and-a-half
minutes.20 It is also undisputed that if the thiopental fails to take effect, the potassium chloride will cause excruciating pain as it sears its way through the
inmate’s veins on the way to stopping his heart.21 If that were to happen, the
inmate’s pain could be masked by the pancuronium. An inmate, then, could lie
paralyzed, suffocating and experiencing intense burning in his veins, and yet
appear peaceful.22
preme Court recently found its electrocution procedure cruel and unusual under
the Nebraska Constitution. See State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 261-62 (Neb. 2008).
As of March 19, 2009, the Nebraska Legislature’s Judiciary Committee was debating a bill that would institute lethal injection as a new method of execution. See
Paul Hammel, Legislative Panel Fails To Advance Lethal Injection Bill,
Omaha World Herald, Mar. 19, 2009, available at http://www.omaha.com/
index.php?u_page=2798&u_sid=10589642.
18.

See, e.g., Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1527. It would be inaccurate to say that states use the
same procedure, because the safety of the procedure turns in large part on how
the drugs are administered. States using the same drugs can still have very different procedures.
The words “protocol” and “procedure” in the lethal injection context are often used interchangeably. To the extent their meanings differ, “protocol” generally refers to the written document specifying the steps the State should take to
administer the drugs, while “procedure” generally refers to the steps they actually
take, including departures (either intentional or unintentional) from the written
protocol.

19.

Mark Dershwitz & Thomas K. Henthorn, The Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacodynamics of Thiopental as Used in Lethal Injection, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 931, 931
(2008); Teresa A. Zimmers et al., Lethal Injection for Execution: Chemical Asphyxiation?, 4 PLoS Med. 0646, 0646 (2007), http://medicine.plosjournals.org/
perlserv/?request=getdocument&doi=10.1371/ journal.pmed.0040156.

20.

Henthorn Expert Report ¶ 24, Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1236660
[hereinafter Henthorn Report] (expert anesthesiologist explaining speed with
which thiopental takes effect); Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 19, at 933, 936.

21.

Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 880 (M.D. Tenn. 2007); Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 19, at 931; Frank Romanelli et al., Issues Surrounding Lethal Injection as a Means of Capital Punishment, 28 Pharmacotherapy 1429, 1433 (2008).

22.

See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1527; Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 883-84; Suzanne C. Beyea,
Addressing the Trauma of Anesthesia Awareness, 81 Aorn J. 603, 603 (2005); Leonidas G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection for Execution, 365
Lancet 1412, 1414 (2005).
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If properly performed, the three-drug protocol will fully anesthetize the
inmate for the duration of the execution. Such an execution would therefore be
constitutional.23 The key question presented in these cases, then, is whether the
first drug does take effect. The answer cannot be determined, however, by witnesses or execution personnel watching the inmate. First, there are different
planes of anesthesia, and a partially anesthetized person may be unresponsive to
light stimuli, like gentle shaking, but still be able to feel stronger stimuli, like excruciating pain.24 Only a medical professional with training in anesthesiology
sitting at a person’s elbow can accurately determine whether a person has
reached a deep enough plane of anesthesia to be unresponsive to excruciating
pain.25 Most states neither employ a professional with such training nor
position their personnel so close to the inmate.26 Second, the administration of
pancuronium paralyzes the inmate so that he looks serene even if he is not
anesthetized.27 Lethal injection challenges thus often focus on the probability
that the inmate will receive the full dose of thiopental in his veins and be fully
anesthetized before the delivery of the second and third drugs.
That likelihood hinges on how the three-drug procedure is carried out in
each state. Because pancuronium masks pain and because many states do not
take toxicology reports measuring thiopental blood levels immediately after
death, there is no reliable data on how many inmates have suffered painful
deaths. But as details about various states’ procedures emerge, it seems increasingly probable that some states’ procedures have caused and will continue to
cause torturous pain.28
23.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530 (plurality opinion). A properly performed three-drug procedure might still involve pain from the insertion of the IV catheter into the inmate’s veins, but assuming that no unusually painful measures are needed to insert the catheter, such as a cut-down procedure, that degree of pain would not
amount to a constitutional violation. See id. (stating that an Eighth Amendment
violation requires “something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life” (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)).

24.

Henthorn Report, supra note 20, ¶ 9; Colin A. Shanks et al., A PharmacokineticPharmacodynamic Model for Quantal Responses with Thiopental, 21 J. Pharmacokinetics & Biopharmaceutics 309, 316 (1993).

25.

See, e.g., Taylor Trial Transcript at 71, Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL
1236660 [hereinafter Taylor Trial Transcript] (testimony of expert anesthesiologist); Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 19, at 949; Atul Gawande et al., Physicians
and Execution—Highlights from a Discussion of Lethal Injection, 358 New Eng. J.
Med. 448, 450 (2008).

26.

See, e.g., Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 884-86; Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006
WL 1779035, at *7-9 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006).

27.

See, e.g., Beyea, supra note 22, at 603; Koniaris et al., supra note 22, at 1414.

28.

It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a detailed summary of all the
problems that have been uncovered in various states. For a more detailed discussion, see Professor Denno’s excellent articles. See generally Deborah W. Denno,
The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty,
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As an initial matter, it is important to note that death by lethal injection
need not involve this combination of three drugs. The American Veterinary
Medical Association (AVMA), for example, will not use the three-drug protocol
when euthanizing animals, because the risk of pain is too great. Instead, it
favors an overdose of the barbiturate pentobarbital that eliminates the risk of
pain.29 If the injection of barbiturate fails to kill the animal, the veterinarian
simply administers a second dose.30 Paralytics like pancuronium therefore play
no role in animal euthanasia, and, indeed, have actually been statutorily banned
in several states that nevertheless use those same drugs during the execution of
humans.31 As Professor Alper puts it, “virtually all (97.6%) lethal injections in
this country have taken place in states that have either implicitly or explicitly
banned, for use in animal euthanasia, the same drugs that are used in those
states during human executions.”32 Moreover, whereas veterinary consensus has
resulted from decades of study, lethal injection procedures are not the products
of any scientific review.33 To the contrary, they are often haphazardly conceived

76 Fordham L. Rev. 49 (2007) [hereinafter Denno, Quandary] (examining how
states ended up with constitutionally suspect lethal injection procedures); Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 Ohio
St. L.J. 63, 90-120 (2002) [hereinafter Denno, Paradox] (questioning presumption
that lethal injection is a constitutional method of execution).
I should emphasize that I am not suggesting that all lethal injection claims
are necessarily meritorious. Although several states’ procedures are problematic,
some may well be safe and painless.
29.

Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the Public Conscience: Lethal Injection and Animal Euthanasia, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 817, 836-37 (2008).

30.

Id. at 836.

31.

See id. at 841-42 (noting that nine states—Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, and Tennessee—explicitly ban
the use of neuromuscular blocking agents in animal euthanasia, that another
twenty-eight states implicitly ban the use of such drugs by mandating a particular
method of euthanasia, and that many of these same states use pancuronium in
their lethal injection procedures).

32.

Id. at 844.

33.

See id. at 834 (explaining that the AVMA updates its guidelines at least once every
ten years by reviewing all scientific literature evaluating methods and potential
methods of euthanasia); Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 70 (explaining that
lethal injection procedures were never studied); Ellen Kreitzberg & David Richter,
But Can It Be Fixed? A Look at Constitutional Challenges to Lethal Injection Executions, 47 Santa Clara L. Rev. 445, 459 (2007) (explaining that there has never
been “critical re-evaluation” of a lethal injection procedure “to assess whether
modern medical or scientific knowledge could improve the existing protocol”).
267
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and performed, and this general lack of care creates the substantial risk that
something will go wrong and cause severe pain.34
Probably the most serious and complicated problem with many states’
lethal injection procedures is the use of untrained and unqualified personnel.35
The California District Court, for example, found that “[t]he [execution] team
members almost uniformly have no knowledge of the nature or properties of
the drugs that are used or the risks or potential problems associated with the
procedure.”36 Such ignorance about the drugs is common. When executions
take longer than expected in Virginia, the execution team inexplicably administers more pancuronium and potassium, but not more thiopental.37 In other
words, Virginia re-administers not anesthetic, but the drugs that mask and
cause pain. In Missouri, the executioners injected the drugs as quickly as possible,38 mistakenly believing that thiopental renders a person fully unconscious
within fifteen seconds.39 In reality, it may take up to two and a half minutes for
thiopental to take full effect.40 Compounding these problems, states do not adequately train their execution teams to make up for these deficiencies or even
require their teams to read the execution protocol.41
Such ignorance places special importance on the ostensible team leader. In
Missouri, for instance, the only team member who claimed to understand the
procedure was Dr. Alan Doerhoff (referred to in the litigation as “John Doe I”),

34.

See, e.g., Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 56-58 (summarizing haphazard and
“disturbing” details about states’ lethal injection procedures).

35.

This discussion mostly characterizes the procedures as they existed in states during recent litigation. Some states have changed their procedures recently, although
most such changes are minor.

36.

Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006); see also Harbison v.
Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 888-90 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (finding execution team
members “largely ignorant” of the drugs’ risks).

37.

Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 296-97 (4th Cir. 2008).

38.

See Deposition of Larry Crawford, Taylor v. Crawford at 129-31, 2006 WL 1779035
(W.D. Mo. May 23, 2006) (No. 05-4173) (containing explanation by DOC Director
that drugs are injected in rapid succession).

39.

Deposition of Dr. John Doe at 20, Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 5,
2006) (No. 05-4173) [hereinafter Doe Deposition].

40.

See Henthorn Report supra note 20, ¶ 24.

41.

See, e.g., Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 979 (“‘[W]e don’t have training, really.’”);
Governor’s Comm’n on Admin. of Lethal Injection, Final Report with
Findings and Recommendations 8 (2007) [hereinafter Florida Commission
Report] (finding “[f]ailure of the training of the [Florida] execution team members”); 11/27/2006 Am. Joint Pre-Hr’g Conf. Statement at 55, Morales (No. 060219) (indicating that California team members had never read the protocol).
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the doctor heading the procedure.42 Doerhoff turned out to be incompetent or
callous, lowering the amount of the thiopental and making other changes to the
procedure without consulting any Department of Corrections (DOC) authorities.43 These actions belied Missouri’s public representations throughout litigation that it used five grams of thiopental during all executions.44 In reality, the
DOC’s chemical log showed that Doerhoff sometimes prepared only 2.5 or
fewer grams.45 When asked about the discrepancy, Doerhoff admitted that he
was dyslexic and never knew how much thiopental he mixed.46 The log therefore represented only his very rough approximations.47
Dyslexia was hardly Doerhoff’s only problem. His deposition revealed several false assertions about a variety of medical issues, casting serious doubt on
his professional competence.48 Additionally, Doerhoff’s surgical training gave
him no background in the anesthesiological tasks crucial to the procedure.49 To
42.

Dr. Doerhoff’s identity was published several weeks after the trial by the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch. See Jeremy Kohler, Behind the Mask of the Mo. Execution Doctor,
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 29, 2006, at A-1.

43.

See Taylor v. Crawford, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006); Doe
Deposition, supra note 39 at 96.

44.

See, e.g., Def. Crawford’s 9/12/2005 Answers to Plaintiff’s First Interrogatories
at 8-9, Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173; Defs’ 5/17/06 Letter to J. Gaitan at 1,
Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173.

45.

Defs’ 5/17/06 Letter to J. Gaitan, Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173 (apologizing for
the State’s misstatements to the court about the thiopental dose). Successfully
administering either 5 or 2.5 grams of thiopental would be sufficient to fully anesthetize an inmate for the duration of an execution. See Taylor v. Crawford, 487
F.3d 1072, 1076 (8th Cir. 2007). Missouri’s careless approach to its doses nevertheless is troubling, because it demonstrates that the State does not follow its own
procedures. Moreover, a 2.5 gram dose leaves less margin for error in the event of
a leak, infiltration, or some other error.

46.

See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7 (“John Doe I also testified that he felt that he
had the authority to change or modify the formula as he saw fit. It is apparent that
he has changed and modified the protocol on several occasions in the past.”); Doe
Deposition, supra note 39, at 25 (“I am dyslexic and so . . . it’s not unusual for me
to make mistakes.”).

47.

See Doe Deposition, supra note 39, at 25; Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *4-6 (discussing the Doerhoff deposition).

48.

See, e.g., Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7 (court indicating it was “gravely concerned” about Doerhoff’s competence); Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, at
29-57 (medical expert testifying that Doerhoff made several “100% backward,”
“false,” and “very troubling” medical statements).

49.

See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7 (noting that facility with numbers may not be
necessary for surgery, but “is critical when one is mixing and dissolving chemicals
for a lethal injection”); Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, at 29-43 (anesthesiologist expert testifying that it is not “conceivable” than an anesthesiologist would
make the mistakes Doerhoff made).
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make matters worse, Missouri then lacked a written protocol, meaning that
Doerhoff possessed “total discretion” for the procedure and that the whole
team looked entirely to him for its responsibilities.50
Unqualified personnel also create problems setting the intravenous (IV)
catheter. If the catheter is improperly set, the drugs will not all be delivered successfully into the vein. Instead, they will infiltrate, spilling into surrounding
tissues. Infiltration itself is painful, but, even more alarming is the possibility
that it will result in inadequate anesthesia. For example, during the Florida execution of Angel Diaz, inadequate anesthesia resulted in the inmate writhing and
gasping on the gurney for thirty-four minutes before dying.51 An autopsy later
revealed infiltration at his IV site.52 Placing the IV catheter can often be one of
the procedure’s most difficult steps, especially because some condemned inmates are obese or former intravenous drug users, and yet, some states rely on
unqualified personnel to perform this critical task.53
Other problems result from the execution chambers’ architecture. To conceal the identity of their executioners, many states place the inmate on a gurney
in an execution chamber and staff in an adjacent execution support room
where they are hidden from witnesses. After team members place the catheter in
the inmate’s veins, they exit the room, leaving the inmate alone for the duration
of the execution. The execution team then remotely administers the drugs,

50.

Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7-8.

51.

See Florida Commission Report, supra note 41, at 8; Phil Long & Marc Caputo,
Lethal Injection Takes 34 Minutes To Kill Inmate, Miami Herald, Dec. 14, 2006, at
5B. Diaz’s is not the only execution to have visible problems. See, e.g., Kevin Fagan, The Execution of Stanley Tookie Williams, S.F. Chron., Dec. 14, 2005, at A12
(noting that the execution took “36 agonizing minutes”).

52.

Mark J. Heath, Revisiting Physician Involvement in Capital Punishment, 83 Mayo
Clinic Proc. 115, 116 (Jan. 2008) (“Diaz slowly died of the gradual absorption of
infiltrated thiopental, pancuronium, and potassium. During a 34-minute interval,
he gasped like a fish out of water.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
It is important to emphasize that because of the pancuronium, the absence of
visible pain during other executions is no indication that those executions were
problem free. For example, paralysis is possible even where infiltration results in
inadequate anesthesia. Although the thiopental dose is usually more than necessary to anesthetize the inmate, the overdoses of pancuronium are usually even larger. See, e.g., Atul Gawande, Better: A Surgeon’s Notes on Performance
134 (2007). As a result, infiltration might result in too little thiopental for anesthesia but enough pancuronium for paralysis and prolonged death by suffocation.

53.

Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding that the
State’s personnel are “not adequately prepared to deal with” complications associated with setting the IV line); Gawande, supra note 52, at 136, 146 (describing a
state prison warden who claimed that he did not need medical personnel to assist
with executions and that he would start the IVs himself, even though he had never
started one before).
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which travel in tubes from the support room through the wall into the execution chamber, up or down onto the gurney, and finally into the catheter.54
The particulars of remote administration significantly heighten the risk of
error that will lead to pain. For example, execution team members sometimes
work in the dark to protect their identities. This precaution makes it harder for
team members to identify which syringes contain which chemicals, therefore
increasing the risk that they will administer them in the wrong order.55 Additionally, extra-long tubing is necessary to run from the plungers in the support
room to the prisoner in the execution chamber. Such tubing can and has
leaked, disconnected, or kinked.56 Furthermore, because such tubing generally
runs through a hole in the wall, team members cannot see most of it and therefore will not know whether it has been compromised.57 Similarly, because a
sheet usually covers the inmate, team members cannot see the catheter site and
whether the IV has become dislodged.58
Nor can the personnel tell whether the inmate has been sufficiently anesthetized before the second and third drugs are administered. Execution personnel often view the inmate through a window with partially drawn Venetian
blinds. It is, therefore, “almost impossible” to observe the inmate’s anesthetic
depth.59 Of course, even if the window afforded the execution team a better
view of the inmate, judging anesthetic depth would be virtually impossible
because anesthetic depth can only be measured competently at a patient’s elbow

54.

See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 889 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (describing difficulties of remote administration); Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (identifying
the challenges of remote administration).

55.

See Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, at 83 (expert anesthesiologist testifying
that working in the dark is “ridiculous” and exacerbates the risk of complications).

56.

See id. at 78 (expert explaining that extra-long tubing is prone to more problems);
Romanelli et al., supra note 21, at 1433; Heath Roane Decl., supra note 10, at 19 (referencing leaking IV lines in Maryland).

57.

See, e.g., Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (explaining that tubes go through holes
in walls and that IV bags hang from hooks, but that the execution team cannot
verify if the equipment is properly working); Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note
25, at 78 (expert explaining that the “full extent of the IV tubing [should be] completely visible and laid out in a neat fashion so that [the team] can clearly see that
the conduit through which the drugs will flow is working properly”); Gawande et
al., supra note 25, at 450.

58.

See Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (noting that the State’s expert conceded that
sometimes catheters fail and that the IV site should therefore be monitored); Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, at 82 (explaining that the sheet covers the view
of the catheter).

59.

Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8. “Anesthetic depth” refers to the plane of anesthesia—that is, the degree to which a person is anesthetized. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
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by medical professionals with training in anesthesiology.60 Pancuroniuminduced paralysis further exacerbates these difficulties.
Finally, some states have failed to adopt consistent, predictable procedures,
leading to inconsistent behavior and recordkeeping.61 Poor recordkeeping, of
course, makes it harder for the team to develop predictable patterns of behavior. That haphazardness, in turn, can create deviations from the standard procedure, make errors more likely, and render it harder to learn from past errors.
And even if the team somehow were to discover problems, some states have no
contingency plans to deal with them.62
Of course, current procedures do further certain goals. They protect the
executioners’ anonymity (e.g., the remote administration) and show the witnesses a serene execution (e.g., the pancuronium). The inmate’s pain, though, is
a background issue to which many states have given only minimal thought.
Federal courts in California, Missouri, and Tennessee have found serious
flaws with their states’ lethal injection procedures and required changes.63 More
often, courts have granted minimal or no relief, despite some or many of the
aforementioned problems.64 Still others have entered stays to learn more about
apparently problematic procedures only to be reversed on other grounds.65
Litigation is still pending elsewhere.66
60.

See, e.g., Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, at 71 (expert anesthesiologist explaining that anesthesiologists monitoring anesthetic depth during executions
must “be physically in contact with the patient, standing right by their head and
able to test various reflexes” and that because the Missouri doctor observed only
through a window from an adjacent room and lacked important equipment, he
could not “make any meaningful determination of anesthetic depth”); Dershwitz
& Henthorn, supra note 19, at 949.

61.

See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *3 (noting that Missouri was still trying to understand error in its own recordkeeping); Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 979 (describing California’s erratic recordkeeping).

62.

See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *9 (ordering that Missouri put in place contingency plans in case problems develop during an execution); Heath Roane Decl.,
supra note 10, at 25 (explaining that federal protocol “made no provisions whatsoever for the foreseeable contingency of IV access failure”).

63.

See Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 903; Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *9; Morales II, 465
F. Supp. 2d at 978-84. The Missouri decision was subsequently reversed on appeal,
and the case was subsequently dismissed on remand. See Taylor v. Crawford, 487
F.3d 1072, 1085 (8th Cir. 2007); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 07-4129, slip op. at 4-5
(W.D. Mo. July 15, 2008).

64.

See, e.g., Brown v. Beck, No. 06-3018, slip op. at 6-7 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 17, 2006), aff’d
445 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 2006) (permitting state to proceed with executions with
minimal revision); Emmett v. Johnson, 511 F. Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Va. 2007) (granting state’s motion for summary judgment), aff’d, 532 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2008);
State v. Schwab, 995 So. 2d 922, 932 (Fla. 2008) (upholding Florida’s procedure).

65.

See Boltz v. Jones, 182 Fed. App. 824, 825 (10th Cir. 2006) (vacating a stay issued by
the Oklahoma district court due in part to the “State’s interest in the timely effec-
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B. The Supreme Court’s Fractured Decision in Baze v. Rees
The outcomes of these pending cases will depend in part on how courts interpret the United States Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Baze v. Rees.67 Baze
was the Supreme Court’s first case directly addressing the constitutionality of a
state’s lethal injection procedure. The Court had already held in Nelson v.
Campbell and Hill v. McDonough that death row inmates could bring an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge a state’s execution procedures and that such
actions were not subject to habeas corpus’s more rigorous procedural gatekeeping requirements.68 But Baze was the Court’s first foray into the Eighth
Amendment legal standard governing lethal injection cases.
Baze considered the constitutionality of Kentucky’s version of the threedrug protocol. Litigation in Kentucky had not revealed systemic problems of
the sort discovered in Missouri, California, and Tennessee. Kentucky, in fact,
had conducted only one execution by lethal injection, so the record was
sparse.69 Moreover, the plaintiff received incomplete discovery, so there was no

tuation of its final criminal judgments”); McNair v. Allen, 06-695, 2007 WL
4463489, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 14, 2007) (noting “substantial but disputed evidence” that Alabama’s protocol contains “constitutional deficiencies in the monitoring of the procedure, the training of certain participants, and the use of potentially unconstitutionally painful drugs” and staying the execution), rev’d, 515 F.3d
1168, 1172 (11th Cir. 2008) (vacating the stay on statute of limitations grounds).
66.

See, e.g., Jones v. Bradshaw, No. 07-3766 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2009) (order remanding
case back to Ohio district court for discovery); Plaintiffs’ Surreply, Roane v. Gonzales, No. 05-2337 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2008) (arguing that court should resolve case
on merits after full discovery); Motion for Summary Judgment, Dickens v. Napolitano, No. 07-1770 (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2009).

67.

128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).

68.

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), “second or
successive” habeas petitions must be dismissed, except in narrow circumstances.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hill and Nelson,
some lower courts had dismissed lethal injection claims by treating them as “successive” habeas petitions, even though they had been filed as § 1983 actions. See,
e.g., Hill v. Crosby, 437 F.3d 1084, 1085 (11th Cir. 2006) (“It is clear to us that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant’s [lethal injection] claim
because it is the functional equivalent of a successive habeas petition and he failed
to obtain leave of this court to file it.”), rev’d sub nom. Hill v. McDonough, 547
U.S. 573 (2006). The Supreme Court made clear in Hill that because a lethal injection claim does “not challenge the lethal injection sentence as a general matter but
seeks instead only to enjoin the respondents from executing [plaintiff] in the
manner they currently intend,” it can be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is
therefore exempt from AEDPA’s stringent gatekeeping provisions. Hill, 547 U.S. at
580 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637,
647 (2004).

69.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1528.
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evidence that Kentucky had ever had any problems with its procedure.70 There
was no smoking gun—no equivalent of Missouri’s dyslexic doctor or Florida’s
writhing inmate—and, in fact, little evidence at all. The limited record did indicate that Kentucky takes precautionary measures absent in other states, such as
using a phlebotomist to insert the catheters, thus decreasing the risk of infiltration.71 Kentucky also requires wardens to remain in the execution chamber with
the prisoner to watch for IV problems, including infiltration.72 Additionally, it
requires its team to participate in at least ten practice sessions a year.73 In short,
in comparison to other states, the Kentucky record was decidedly clean.74
The Supreme Court’s decision upholding the procedure was extremely
fractured; seven different Justices wrote opinions, and no single opinion garnered more than three votes. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion,
which was joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito. In upholding the Kentucky
procedure, the plurality tried to clarify the Eighth Amendment standard for
method-of-execution claims. It required the plaintiff to establish both (1) that
the current lethal injection procedure poses “a substantial risk of serious
harm”75 and (2) that the state has refused to adopt a “feasible, readily
implemented” alternative “significantly” reducing that risk.76 The plurality,
thus, agreed with petitioners that the availability of a safer procedure was constitutionally relevant but emphasized that “a condemned prisoner cannot suc-

70.

For example, the plaintiffs’ attorneys were unable to depose the executioners. See
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16, Baze (No. 07-5439). Despite this limited record,
the plaintiff represented in his petition for certiorari that the record was, in fact,
uniquely complete in comparison to other lethal injection cases. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 24, Baze (No. 07-5439) (“[T]his case presents the most succinct and complete record for this Court to address the important legal issues
raised by challenges [to lethal injection.]”).

71.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533-34. A phlebotomist is an individual trained to draw blood
and insert catheters into veins. At oral argument, the State contended that this
phlebotomist “is probably literally the best qualified human being in the Commonwealth of Kentucky to place the IV line.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 28,
Baze (No. 07-5439).

72.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534.

73.

Id.

74.

See id. at 1542 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the question of whether the
three-drug protocol can be practiced in other states could be answered differently
in a state with a “more complete record”); id. at 1566 (Breyer, J., concurring) (indicating that the record in Kentucky provided “too little reason” to believe that
additional safeguards were necessary); id. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (favoring remand for additional factfinding).

75.

Id. at 1531 (plurality opinion) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842
(1994)).

76.

Id. at 1532.
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cessfully challenge a State’s method of execution merely by showing a slightly or
marginally safer alternative.”77 Instead:
the alternative procedure must be feasible, readily implemented, and in
fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. If a State refuses to adopt such an alternative in the face of these documented advantages, without a legitimate penological justification for adhering to
its current method of execution, then a State’s refusal to change its
method can be viewed as “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth
Amendment.78
An inmate challenging a method of execution, then, must demonstrate both the
shortcomings of the state’s existing procedures and the relative merits of an
alternative.
The Kentucky plaintiffs failed to make either showing. Whereas plaintiffs in
other states had uncovered problems that greatly heightened the risk that thiopental delivery would be compromised, the plaintiffs in Kentucky presented no
such evidence. Indeed, they were not even permitted to depose the execution
personnel, a denial of discovery that made it difficult to gather evidence about
the true nature of the Kentucky procedure.79 Instead of evidence about how the
procedure was carried out in practice, the Kentucky record included mostly
details about the written protocol, which demonstrated that Kentucky had
adopted particular safeguards to ensure successful thiopental delivery. The
three-Justice plurality, therefore, rejected petitioners’ argument that they might
not receive an adequate dose of thiopental.80
Nor did the Kentucky plaintiffs convince the Court that the use of
pancuronium bromide to paralyze the inmates was itself problematic. Even
though pancuronium makes it almost impossible to tell whether an inmate has
been properly anesthetized (particularly given that laypeople often monitor
anesthetic depth), the plurality concluded that the pancuronium prevented involuntary physical movements, and that the state “has an interest in preserving
the dignity of the procedure, especially where convulsions or seizures could be
misperceived as signs of consciousness or distress.”81
77.

Id. at 1531.

78.

Id. at 1532.

79.

Reply Brief for Petitioner at 16 n.2, Baze (No. 07-5439) (arguing that trial court’s
denial of depositions was “inexplicable”).

80.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533-34 (plurality opinion).

81.

Id. at 1535. The plurality also argued that Kentucky’s continued use of the threedrug protocol could not be seen as posing an “‘objectively intolerable risk’ when
no other State has adopted the one-drug method.” Id. at 1535; see also id. at 1532
(noting that “it is difficult to regard a practice as ‘objectively intolerable’ when it is
in fact widely tolerated”). It is not clear why a widespread practice should be considered presumptively valid, since a method of execution can cause excruciating
pain but still be widespread. To be sure, a widespread practice might not be “unusual,” but the Eighth Amendment surely does not permit excruciating execution
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Significantly, the Kentucky plaintiffs also had failed to present to the trial
court evidence about an alternative protocol. This failure left the Supreme
Court “without any findings on the effectiveness of petitioners’ barbiturateonly protocol.”82 Given the plurality’s explicitly comparative approach—that is,
given that the lethal injection plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative procedure that “in fact significantly
reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain”83—the absence of findings demonstrating the superiority of the one-drug protocol or another alternative necessarily doomed the Kentucky plaintiffs.
As for future plaintiffs in different states with different evidence, Baze
leaves the door open for lethal injection challenges alleging that a state has
refused to change its method of execution notwithstanding a feasible, readily
implemented, significantly safer alternative procedure.84 The Justices, however,
disagreed about just how open the door remains. Chief Justice Roberts wrote
that an inmate “must show that the risk [of severe pain] is substantial when
compared to the known and available alternatives. A State with a lethal injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold today would not
create a risk that meets this standard.”85 One question in future cases, then, will
be whether a given state’s procedure is “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s.86

procedures so long as they are widespread. Reliance on the fact that a procedure is
“widely tolerated” then unduly tempts courts to ignore the major political process
failures that have caused flawed procedures to become widespread in the first
place. See infra Part III.
82.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534 (plurality opinion). The plurality also noted that Tennessee
had rejected a proposal to adopt a one-drug protocol, thus demonstrating that the
“comparative efficacy of a one-drug method of execution is not so well established.” Id. at 1535. Whether misinformed or disingenuous, this argument misses
the mark, because a single Tennessee bureaucrat rejected the recommendation of
a one-drug protocol presented by a committee charged with re-evaluating the
State’s lethal injection policy. See infra notes 265-270 and accompanying text.

83.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532.

84.

Id.

85.

Id. at 1537 (emphasis added).

86.

Another reading of the plurality’s “substantially similar” language is that it refers
only to the standard needed to obtain a stay. See id. at 1537 (explaining that “[a]
stay of execution may not be granted on grounds such as those asserted here
unless the condemned prisoner establishes that the State’s lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain” and, adding two sentences later,
that a “substantially similar” protocol would not meet this standard). Under this
reading, a court only need inquire whether a given state’s procedure is “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s if the inmate plaintiff would need a stay of execution
for his litigation to continue.

276

Article - Eric Berger - 28 - Production - 2009.05.15.doc

5/15/2009 1:00 PM

LETHAL INJECTION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

The plurality suggests that Baze resolves many challenges.87 But it is
virtually impossible to know before discovery whether another state’s procedures are “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s. It is true that at least thirty states
use the same three drugs Kentucky does.88 Two execution procedures, though,
can hardly be deemed “substantially similar” merely because they use the same
drugs.89 As litigation has demonstrated, the procedure’s safety hinges on how
the drugs are administered. And while a state’s written protocol can lend some
insight into that state’s practices, some states do not follow their own written
protocols. Kentucky’s procedure was easy to uphold, because there was minimal
evidence about how Kentucky’s procedures actually worked. “Only one
Kentucky prisoner . . . has been executed since the Commonwealth adopted
lethal injection,” and there were “no reported problems” at that execution.90 By
way of contrast, serious problems have been documented in other states.
Given that the safety of a method of execution depends not just on the four
corners of the written protocol but on the details of administration, a state’s
procedure could not be deemed “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s without
discovery into that state’s actual practices—the training and qualifications of its
execution team, the suitability of the equipment, the architecture of the execution facilities, and so on. In other words, the “substantially similar” inquiry is
necessarily a question of fact and, like all questions of fact, cannot be answered
without fact-finding. Indeed, given states’ efforts to conceal the details of their
procedure, discovery in lethal injection cases often requires particularly attentive judicial supervision.91
Whether Baze will, in fact, be interpreted this way is less certain. Justice
Alito’s concurrence emphasized that the plurality had erected a high hurdle for
these claims and contended that Justices Stevens and Thomas were incorrect in

87.

See id. at 1537 (plurality opinion) (arguing that the plurality decision “resolves
more challenges than [Justice Stevens] acknowledges”); id. at 1542 (Alito, J., concurring).

88.

Id. at 1527 n.1.

89.

See Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 311 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J., dissenting)
(“Merely using identical drugs, but in varying amounts and at varying times in the
procedure, hardly yields ‘largely identical’ lethal injection protocols.”).

90.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1528 (plurality opinion).

91.

See, e.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 982 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that
California had not fulfilled its discovery obligations despite court orders to do so);
Oken v. Sizer, 321 F. Supp. 2d 658, 663 (D. Md. 2004) (noting that the State’s refusal to disclose execution protocol denied plaintiff a “minimal hearing”); Denno,
Quandary, supra note 28, at 95 (explaining that “states never have been forthcoming about how they perform lethal injections” and adding that some states recently have retreated into “greater secrecy”).
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perceiving that the decision would lead to substantial litigation.92 Emphasizing
that the opinion must be read so as to avoid “litigation gridlock” and “a grave
danger of extended delay,”93 Justice Alito would have set an especially low bar
for finding another state’s procedure “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s. Justice Stevens’s concurrence disagreed, arguing that “[t]he question whether a
similar three-drug protocol may be used in other States remains open, and may
well be answered differently in a future case on the basis of a more complete
record.”94 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,95 agreed with Justice Stevens
that more litigation was certain to follow,96 but, relying on his interpretation of
the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment, would have found a constitutional violation only if the method of execution “is deliberately designed to
inflict pain.”97
The three remaining Justices—Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—all agreed on
yet another Eighth Amendment standard: “whether the method creates an
untoward, readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary suffering.”98 This standard would consider three interrelated factors—the degree of
92.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1538 (Alito, J., concurring). Of course, it is notable that the Chief
Justice did not feel compelled to incorporate Justice Alito’s concerns into the plurality opinion.

93.

Id. at 1542 (Alito, J., concurring).

94.

Id. at 1542 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens’s concurrence received significant attention, because even though he voted to uphold the Kentucky procedure,
he also announced his conclusion that “the death penalty represents the ‘pointless
and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible
social or public purposes.’” Id. at 1551 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).

95.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also wrote his own dissent objecting to
Justice Stevens’s views about the death penalty more generally. See id. at 1552-56
(Scalia, J., concurring).

96.

Id. at 1563 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the plurality standard as “unworkable”).

97.

Id. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring). Because of the attention to “evolving standards of decency,” history informs Eighth Amendment doctrine less than it does
other constitutional areas. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (stating that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”) (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Consequently, a method of execution that was
once acceptable might be unconstitutional today, either because new evidence
demonstrates that it creates a previously unknown unacceptable risk of excruciating pain or because new values reject that kind of punishment as inhumane. Justice Thomas’s reliance on history, while consistent with interpretation of other
constitutional provisions, see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783
(2008), is therefore mostly anomalous in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.

98.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 1572 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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risk, magnitude of pain, and availability of alternatives. “[A] strong showing on
one reduces the importance of the others.”99 However, whereas Justice Breyer
could not find “sufficient evidence that Kentucky’s execution method poses” an
unconstitutional risk of severe pain,100 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice
Souter, would have vacated and remanded for further fact-finding.101
Because Baze relied on an incomplete record and resulted in seven different
opinions, it is difficult to know what the law is.102 It is true that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys
the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”103 Even to the extent, though, that the three-Justice plurality’s
opinion may be viewed as the holding, it offers incomplete clarification. For
instance, the plurality, citing a prison health case, stated that to amount to an
Eighth Amendment violation, “the conditions presenting the risk [of pain]
must be ‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,’ and
give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’”104 This articulation appears to set
an extremely high standard for a violation. Taken in isolation, this sentence implies that an execution procedure that more likely than not caused excruciating
pain would not violate the Eighth Amendment unless pain were “very likely.”
Although courts have never quantified Eighth Amendment risk, this passage

99.

Id. at 1568 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring). By
way of contrast, the plurality appears to have put particular weight on the degree
of risk. See id. at 1532 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he proffered alternatives must effectively address a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 842 (1994))).

100. Id. at 1563-64 (Breyer, J., concurring).
101.

Id. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

102. It is also difficult to know why the Court granted certiorari at all. One explanation
is that the Court took Mr. Baze’s attorneys at their word when they claimed to
have a complete record and granted certiorari before examining the record carefully. See supra note 70. Another theory is that Baze was an unfriendly grant, in
which four pro-death penalty Justices deliberately selected a case with an undeveloped record, because such a case would make it easier to uphold the procedure
and articulate a stricter legal standard. This theory is further bolstered by the fact
that when the Court granted certiorari in Baze, it also had before it a petition for
certiorari from the Eighth Circuit in Taylor. Notwithstanding the Eighth Circuit’s
reversal of the district court and Mr. Baze’s claims to the contrary, Taylor unquestionably presented more evidence suggesting an Eighth Amendment violation. See
supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
103.

Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).

104. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (plurality opinion) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 33 (1993)). Baze’s reliance on Helling is surprising, because courts typically treat
method-of-execution and prison conditions challenges as separate doctrinal lines.
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would seem to say that 95% chance of pain would amount to a constitutional
violation, but 51% chance of pain would not.
Yet it is almost impossible to believe that five Justices on the Court would
consciously approve a procedure they know causes excruciating pain more than
half the time. Indeed, Helling v. McKinney, the case upon with the plurality relied to offer such a suggestion, held that a prisoner states a viable cause of action
under the Eighth Amendment by alleging exposure to health risks (such as secondary smoke) that very well may never result in illness or pain.105 Helling, then,
does not seem to stand for the proposition that conditions need to be “sure or
very likely” to cause suffering to trigger an Eighth Amendment violation. Moreover, the plurality’s further discussion suggests that it was not thinking in these
terms, for, later on, it announced that a state violates the Eighth Amendment if
it refuses to adopt an alternative procedure that “significantly reduce[s] a
substantial risk of severe pain.”106 Phrased this way, the standard seems to focus
less on the original procedure’s degree of risk and more on whether the alternative would significantly reduce that risk, so long as that initial risk is itself
“substantial.” But “substantial” is a mushy word, so this language might well
allow the finding of a violation for a state that refuses to switch from a procedure creating, for example, a 20% risk of pain to a procedure that would lower
that risk of pain to 1%.107 In short, this muddle does little to provide guidance to
lower courts.
II. Remedial Anxieties and Lethal Injection
A. How Remedy Constrains the Right
Generally speaking, courts before and after Baze have been reluctant to engage with lethal injection issues. In rejecting these claims, judges often employ
the kind of rhetoric commonly used to criticize the imposition of constitutional
remedies, sounding in themes of judicial restraint, federalism, and separation of
powers. Many lower courts never reach the remedial issue as a formal matter,
because they decline to find a violation at all. But although courts are imprecise
about exactly how and why remedial concerns should limit the Eighth Amendment right, the problem of what remedy to impose nonetheless significantly

105.

Helling, 509 U.S. at 33. It is also worth noting that prison health cases require a
finding of deliberate indifference not required in method-of-execution challenges.
Compare id. at 33 (requiring deliberate indifference in a prison health challenge),
with Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1525-38 (not requiring a finding of deliberate indifference).

106. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107.

280

Of course, it is impossible to quantify precisely the risk of pain in these cases, but
such a discussion helps identify ambiguities and inconsistencies in the plurality’s
approach.
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colors these courts’ rulings.108 Courts, thus, move the focus from the rightholder—the plaintiff whose rights have been allegedly violated—to the
defendant against whom the remedy would be imposed.109
It is worth noting that some attention to potential alternatives is justifiable.
After all, the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment”110 implicitly asks if the practice at issue creates a significant risk of pain
compared to available alternatives.111 An Eighth Amendment standard premised
on unnecessary risk of pain must consider, then, whether a different method
could plausibly remove that risk. If not, the risk might be necessary.
That being said, painless methods of execution do exist,112 so the remedial
inquiry should rarely be dispositive in cases in which the plaintiff has demonstrated a real risk of pain.113 Courts, however, typically have not thought
through precisely what role the remedial inquiry plays in the larger Eighth
Amendment analysis. To the contrary, many courts have failed to explore in detail the relative merits of different methods of execution. Instead, they have often sidestepped that important question to assert the danger of any judicially
imposed remedy, regardless of the details.114
It is odd to think that the possibility of any judicially imposed remedy
should dispositively militate against finding an Eighth Amendment violation.
As a formal matter, the primary focus at the rights stage should be (and prior to
Baze often was) whether the execution procedure subjects the inmate to a significant or unnecessary risk of excruciating pain.115 Courts’ remedial inquiry,
108. Of course, remedies are not the only factor driving courts’ behavior here, but they
are significant and overlooked in the scholarship.
109. See Susan Poser, Termination of Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive Meaning of
Unitary Status, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 283, 323-24 (2002) (arguing that the remedial question changes depending on whether the court focuses on the plaintiff’s rights or
steps the defendant has taken to comply with its legal duty).
110.

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

111.

See, e.g., Timothy K. Kuhner, The Foreign Source Doctrine: Expanding the Role of
Foreign and International Law in Interpreting the Constitution, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev.
1389, 1412 (2007) (“‘Cruel and unusual’ is a comparative phrase” begging the question “‘cruel and unusual compared to what?’”).

112.

See infra Subsection IV.A.1.

113.

The exception might be a case in which the plaintiff has refused to proffer an alternative. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.

114.

See infra Section IV.A (arguing that courts have incorrectly assumed that any
remedy would necessarily be onerous, intrusive, and therefore inappropriate);
Subsections II.A.1, II.A.2 (arguing that courts have used remedial concerns to
avoid engaging with the details of the challenged procedures, even when confronted with evidence of the procedures’ dangers).

115.

See, e.g., Cooper v. Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment protects against “an unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain
and suffering”); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
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then, has changed the very nature of the right, distracting attention away from
the question of whether the existing method of execution is potentially
painful.116
In a seminal article, Professor Levinson explains how undesirable remedial
consequences can prompt courts to limit or extinguish rights to avoid those
consequences.117 Constitutional rights, Levinson explains, “are inevitably shaped
by, and incorporate, remedial concerns.”118 Rights are dependent on remedies
not just for their real world application, but for their scope and “very
existence.”119 Thus, as Professor Gewirtz explains, “[t]he prospect of actualizing
(same); Evans v. Saar, 412 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524 (D. Md. 2006) (same); Fernando J.
Gaitan, Jr., Challenges Facing Society in the Implementation of the Death Penalty, 35
Fordham Urb. L.J. 763, 784 (2008) (“The person who we must be concerned
about in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is the condemned.”). This focus on
the right possessor’s pain also makes sense given that the Eighth Amendment in
the method-of-execution context is almost always thought to confer an individual
right, rather than a structural protection. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights 104-08 (1998) (suggesting that a jury right might not be an individual
right but rather a structural provision).
116.

It is true that constitutional inquiries sometimes balance state interests against the
asserted right. In the Fourth Amendment context, for instance, courts seek to balance the right of privacy against the need for law enforcement and safety. See, e.g.,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (allowing an exception to the exclusionary rule
for a revolver found during a reasonable search of the suspect). Such constitutional balancing, though, may only encroach so far on a constitutional right’s
core. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (explaining that even though constitutional rights are not absolute, the Second Amendment “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”). In the Eighth Amendment
method-of-execution context, that core protects the inmate against excruciating
pain and should be protected in the absence of overwhelming contrary interests.

117.

Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L.
Rev. 857, 885 (1999) (arguing that “the threat of undesirable remedial consequences [can] motivat[e] courts to construct the right in such a way as to avoid
those consequences”).

118.

Id. at 873. But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1274, 1314-17 (2006) (arguing that Levinson’s “pragmatic” model is “unduly reductionist” and that the “pragmatist must
deny the possibility of right answers to constitutional questions”).

119.

Levinson, supra note 117, at 858. Levinson calls this phenomenon “remedial
equilibration.” Id. at 884-85. He explains that remedial equilibration usually involves the redefinition of rights and remedies “in an iterated process” in which a
series of cases gradually hash out the appropriate remedy for the violation of a
constitutional right. Id. at 874. In this way, the right itself is redefined. Id. at 87374. Lethal injection challenges typically do not spawn this kind of a series of cases,
but, at a more basic level, Levinson’s insights still highlight the extent to which
courts shape the content of a constitutional right in response to remedial anxieties.
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rights through a remedy—the recognition that rights are for actual people in an
actual world—makes it inevitable that thoughts of remedy will affect thoughts
of right, that judges’ minds will shuttle back and forth between right and
remedy.”120 In other words, remedial concerns shape constitutional rights even
if courts, as a formal matter, are not reaching the remedial inquiry and are
making false assumptions about the remedial issues.
1.

Remedial Concerns in Baze

In articulating a stringent Eighth Amendment standard, the Supreme Court
in Baze relied heavily on arguments about the remedy. The second prong of the
plurality’s standard required the plaintiff to show the existence of a “feasible,
readily implemented” remedy that would “significantly reduce a substantial risk
of severe pain.”121 The right, in other words, explicitly incorporates a remedial
inquiry.
Given that the Eighth Amendment’s words “cruel” and “unusual” seem to
invite this kind of comparative examination,122 the plurality’s mention of alternative methods is unsurprising and appropriate.123 What is more noteworthy,
however, is how the Chief Justice addressed the remedial issues. Given the gaps
in the record and particular safeguards adopted by Kentucky, the plurality easily
concluded that “the risks identified by petitioners are [not] so substantial or
imminent as to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.”124 Having found
that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the first “substantial risk” prong of the standard, the plurality could have ended the case or merely articulated the second
prong—the showing of a significantly better alternative. But not only did the
plurality require this second prong, it explained at length why a rigorous remedial showing was essential. Specifically, the plurality argued that the finding of
“an Eighth Amendment violation” without the showing of a significantly better
alternative procedure “would threaten to transform courts into boards of
inquiry charged with determining ‘best practices’ for executions, with each rul-

120. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 679 (1983).
121.

Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 75-78
and accompanying text (summarizing the plurality’s two-prong standard).

122.

See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.

123.

In addition to implementing the Eighth Amendment’s comparative inquiry, the
plurality’s requirement that the plaintiff proffer an alternative method also guards
against disingenuous plaintiffs who challenge the current method with every intention of challenging any replacement method, no matter how safe. It is appropriate for courts to guard against such disingenuous litigation. However, to the
extent these concerns seem to drive the plurality’s approach, the plurality seems
not to trust lower courts’ abilities to distinguish between genuine actions challenging dangerous procedures from disingenuous ones challenging safe procedures. See infra notes 195-196 and accompanying text.

124.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534 (plurality opinion).
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ing supplanted by another round of litigation touting a new and improved
methodology.”125
The plurality thus tied the Eighth Amendment standard to remedial issues
in different ways. First, the plurality insisted that the plaintiff must proffer an
alternative method of execution that is more than “slightly or marginally safer”
than the current method.126 It then rejected the Kentucky plaintiffs’ suit,
because their affirmative case lacked that remedial presentation.127 Regardless of
the safety of the Kentucky procedure, then, the plaintiffs would have lost for
failing to present a remedial showing that, prior to Baze, had not been clearly
required. The plaintiffs, however, had suggested alternative approaches in the
proceedings below and had extensively developed the one-drug protocol’s
advantages in their Supreme Court brief.128 The plurality ignored the one-drug
proposal, finding that it had not been adequately developed in the lower
courts.129 It is understandable that the plurality did not want to adopt a remedy
on which there were only limited trial court findings, but it then proceeded to
denigrate that same remedy’s viability.130 It thus made it harder for future plaintiffs to propose that remedy. In other words, the plurality used the absence of
trial court factual findings on the plaintiff’s proposed remedy to dismiss the
claim on the merits. It then sought to discredit that same remedial proposal, despite the inadequacy of the record below and extensive expert testimony in
other cases that its advantages are significant.131
Second, the plurality warned that finding for plaintiff would force courts to
issue a remedy requiring that the state replace its old method with the safest
method available—that is, with the “best practice.”132 In other words, the plural125.

Id. at 1531.

126.

Id.

127.

Id. at 1534.

128.

See Petitioners’ Brief at 51-57, Baze 128 S. Ct. 1520 (No. 07-5439) (explaining the
merits of the one-drug protocol).

129.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534-35 & n.4.

130.

See id. at 1535-36 (raising concerns about one-drug alternative); id. at 1538 (concluding with the observation that the one-drug alternative “has problems of its
own”). But see infra Subsection IV.A.1 (explaining why the one-drug protocol remains viable after Baze).

131.

See infra note 286 and accompanying text. The point is not that the plurality
should have drawn different conclusions about the one-drug protocol, but that it
should not have suggested that it had “problems of its own,” given the absence of
“any findings” about it. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534, 1538. A more appropriate disposition would have been either to dispose of the case without the lengthy remedial inquiry or to remand for further factfinding, especially given that the plaintiff
prior to Baze did not know that the Eighth Amendment standard required a remedial showing as part of the affirmative case. See id. at 1572 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I would therefore remand.”).

132.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (plurality opinion).
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ity feared that whenever a court struck down a lethal injection procedure, it
would have had to “intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing”
the safest possible replacement procedure.133 To drive home the point, the Chief
Justice cited Bell v. Wolfish, in which the Court reversed a structural injunction
in a prison conditions case, thus reiterating that the “wide range of ‘judgment
calls’ that meet constitutional and statutory requirements are confided to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of Government.”134 The plurality, therefore,
emphasized that executive and legislative officials, not judges, should design
states’ lethal injection procedures. Allowing lower courts to require the state to
adopt the “best practice” (and then allowing them to do so repeatedly, as the
“best practice” changed) would shift too much authority from the political
branches to the judiciary.
Here the plurality once again contracted the Eighth Amendment right by
drawing false assumptions about remedial issues. Contrary to the plurality’s
arguments, the finding that a lethal injection procedure created a significant or
unnecessary risk of pain would not require the state to institute the “best practice.” Of course, the “best practice” alternative would be one remedial option,
but a court could also require that the state merely find a better, rather than the
best, practice.135 The district court recognized this possibility in Morales when it
offered the state two remedial options.136 The court did not care which remedy
was best because both would have significantly reduced the risks posed by the
status quo and almost certainly resulted in painless executions. Thus, even if a
court decided that the risks of the three-drug protocol amounted to a constitutional violation, that court, even before Baze, need not have required the “best
practice.” For example, if another alternative would significantly reduce the risk
of pain (but not by as much as the best practice), a court may well be justified in
requiring that other alternative, particularly if it were comparatively inexpensive, unintrusive, and easy to implement. Similarly, courts could issue a
negative injunction allowing a state to craft its own remedy.137 In fact, contrary
to the plurality’s representations, the petitioners never argued that they were
entitled to a “best practice” remedy.138 Instead, they merely contended that the
one-drug alternative was readily available and significantly preferable to the
three-drug approach.139
133.

Id.

134.

Id. at 1531-32 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)).

135.

See infra Section IV.A.

136.

See Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

137.

See infra Subsection IV.A.2.

138.

See generally Petitioners’ Brief at 51-59, Baze (No. 07-5439) (arguing that the adoption of “available alternatives” could reasonably prevent the risk of pain).

139.

See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 19, Baze (No. 07-5439) (contending that a properly administered single dose of a barbiturate is “both lethal and far less dangerous
than the three-drug” protocol).
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Relatedly, the three-Justice plurality also emphasized that the “best
practices” remedy would “embroil the courts in ongoing scientific controversies
beyond their expertise,” thus “substantially intrud[ing] on the role of state
legislatures in implementing their execution procedures.”140 These contentions
are misplaced because the political branches have demonstrated no scientific
understanding that courts lack and because many state legislatures have played
virtually no role in designing execution procedures.141 It is worth emphasizing
here that these arguments suggest that courts lack the institutional competence
to consider a remedy at all. Concluding that it would be “substantially” intrusive for courts to entertain such remedial issues, the plurality then reasoned
backwards that the Eighth Amendment standards proposed by the petitioner
and dissent were improper and that a narrower legal standard was preferable.142
In reality, neither the petitioner’s nor the dissent’s standards would have “substantially intrude[d] on the role of state legislatures”143 or required courts to
impose a “best practice.”144
What is perhaps most striking about the plurality’s approach is that this articulation of a difficult legal standard was unnecessary to the resolution of Baze
itself. Baze was an easy case on the merits. Nevertheless, driven by its concern
that courts in other cases not become “best-practices” boards of inquiry, the
plurality chose not merely to affirm the lower court on the case’s limited record
but also to articulate a legal standard that raised the bar for future lethal injection plaintiffs. By going further than it needed to in deciding this case, the plurality highlighted the extent to which it was uncomfortable with any court intruding on states’ prerogatives to design their own procedures.
2.

Remedial Concerns in Other Lethal Injection Cases

Lower courts addressing these issues pre-Baze also allow a distorted view of
the remedial issues to shape their approaches to the cases. This approach is
most justifiable when a court actually finds serious problems with a procedure
and therefore engages in a direct discussion of potential remedies. After all,
courts imposing remedies on states ought to consider the impact those
remedies will have and whether they might create new problems. The Northern
District of California explored remedial issues in two different opinions in the
140. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (plurality opinion).
141.

See infra Section IV.B.

142.

See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531-32 (plurality opinion) (“Accordingly, we reject petitioners’ proposed ‘unnecessary risk’ standard, as well as the dissent’s ‘untoward’ risk
variation.”); supra Section I.B (discussing the Baze plurality’s standard).

143.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (plurality opinion).

144.

See id. at 1569 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality that proof of a
slightly safer alternative is insufficient and arguing that the standard should ask
whether “readily available measures can materially” reduce the risk of pain); infra
Part IV.
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Morales case. Both times it warned against judicial encroachment and indicated
that the dangers of the procedure could be addressed without placing an undue
burden on the state. In his first order, Judge Fogel permitted California to proceed with its execution of Michael Morales provided that it either execute him
with a dose of a single barbiturate or agree to allow a trained medical professional in anesthesiology to monitor the inmate’s consciousness before the
delivery of the pancuronium and potassium chloride.145 California chose the latter option and secured the participation of two anesthesiologists.146
Even as he required the state to change its practices, Judge Fogel took great
pains to find a solution that would “place a substantially lesser burden on the
State’s strong interest in proceeding” with the execution.147 Indeed, the district
court explained that “under the doctrines of comity and separation of powers,
the particulars of California’s lethal-injection protocol are and should remain
the province of the State’s executive branch.”148 Morales is often cited as one of
the few successful lethal injection challenges, but in fact, the court went to significant lengths to let the state carry out its sentence. It both declined to stay the
execution and deliberately “fashioned a remedy that was intended to permit
Defendants to proceed with Plaintiff’s execution as scheduled.”149
When the issue returned to him, Judge Fogel once again found serious
problems with California’s procedure.150 But instead of formally finding a violation and imposing a remedy, he “respectfully suggest[ed] that Defendants
conduct a thorough review of the lethal-injection protocol.”151 He continued:
Because California’s next execution is unlikely to occur until the latter
part of this year, the State presently is in a particularly good position to
address these issues and put them to rest . . . . [U]nder the doctrines of
comity and separation of powers, the particulars of California’s lethalinjection protocol are and should remain the province of the State’s executive branch. A proactive approach by Defendants would go a long
145.

Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

146. The anesthesiologists subsequently balked when they realized what was being
asked of them, and the State was unable to carry out its execution. Morales v.
Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976-77 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
147.

Morales I, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.

148.

Id. at 1046.

149. Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (discussing Morales I); see also Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Mo. July 25, 2006) (explaining that an injunction against the State “was never intended to unreasonably delay Missouri’s
execution of death row inmates”).
150.

See Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (explaining that the Court was “prepared to
issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the deficiencies
in the administration of California’s current lethal-injection protocol that have
been brought to light in this case” but not doing so yet).

151.

Id. at 975 (quoting Morales I, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1046).
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way toward maintaining judicial and public confidence in the integrity
and effectiveness of the protocol.152
So powerful was the court’s sense of judicial restraint that it allowed the
state to proceed with executions on its own schedule. Indeed, Judge Fogel assured the state that “despite its critical assessment of Defendants’ performance
to date, this Court has no intention of interfering with or delaying California’s
implementation of a constitutional execution protocol. California’s voters and
legislature repeatedly have expressed their support for capital punishment. This
case thus presents an important opportunity for executive leadership.”153
Writing about his ruling later, Judge Fogel reiterated, “[n]owhere in the Memorandum did I order, nor have I ever ordered, that the state take any specific
remedial measure.”154
At least Judge Fogel’s approach acknowledged the California procedure’s
flaws.155 By contrast, other courts relying on similar remedial concerns have not
only failed to find fault with their states’ procedures but also articulated legal
standards higher than necessary to resolve the given case. In rejecting a
plaintiff’s lethal injection claim, in Emmett v. Johnson, the Eastern District of
Virginia, for example, stated that “it is not the office of a federal court to dictate
to the Commonwealth of Virginia the precise methodology it should employ in
carrying out a lawful death sentence.”156 Accordingly, it was up to the Virginia
General Assembly—not a court—to determine “[w]hether or not the procedure
used should conform to prevailing medical standards of care, or whether there
is a more humane execution procedure.”157
One might think that to determine whether a constitutional violation has
occurred, one should look at the facts and legal standard, while concerns about
“dictating” a methodology to state government figure more heavily at the remedial stage. But the court used this deferential language to reject the plaintiff’s
claim on the merits, as though merely considering the procedure’s constitutionality was just too meddlesome.158 Indeed, the court argued that the plaintiff had
offered an “expansive interpretation” of the Eighth Amendment by arguing that
the execution team’s training and qualifications were inadequate.159 The

152.

Id. at 975-76 (quoting Morales I, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1046-47).

153.

Id. at 981-82.

154.

Jeremy Fogel, In the Eye of the Storm: A Judge’s Experience in Lethal-Injection Litigation, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 735, 747 (2008).

155.

Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 978-81.

156.

Emmett v. Johnson, 511 F. Supp. 2d 634, 639 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d, 532 F.3d 291
(4th Cir. 2008).

157.

Id.

158.

Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (citing comity concerns and declining
to interfere in state judicial proceedings).

159.

Emmett, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
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plaintiff, of course, had good reason to link the safety of the procedure to the
competence of the execution team members, but, from the court’s perspective,
a ruling for the plaintiff would require the state to hire professionals with medical training, and this remedy was just too much to ask of Virginia.160
The outcome in this case may well be correct; the Emmett plaintiffs
arguably failed to present enough evidence for a court to find a violation.
Nevertheless, the court’s articulated concerns reflected less about the evidence
presented and more about its own remedial anxieties. In emphasizing these
concerns, the court, much like the Supreme Court in Baze, created an onerous
Eighth Amendment standard that was unnecessary for the resolution of the
instant case.161
Remedial concerns have also prompted some courts to backtrack on rulings
finding serious constitutional problems. In North Carolina, a federal district
court identified serious problems with the lethal injection procedure and conditioned the next execution on a qualified medical professional’s monitoring of
anesthetic depth.162 The state responded instead by proposing a revised protocol
using a bispectral index (BIS) monitor, a machine that some anesthesiologists
use to help monitor a patient’s anesthetic depth.163 The plaintiff presented
extensive, virtually unrebutted evidence that, although a BIS monitor may be
helpful in assessing the effectiveness of anesthesia, it is not suitable as the sole
indicator of level of consciousness.164 The district court, however, did not stand
by its initial order. In “clarify[ying]” its ruling, the court did not alter its
original findings that the state’s procedure was flawed but instead emphasized
that the inclusion of an anesthesiologist to monitor an aesthetic depth was just
too burdensome.165 A BIS monitor, the court decided, cured the procedure’s
flaws. In other words, the court decided that the remedy it had initially imposed
asked too much of the state, even though it had not analyzed whether procuring
160. See id. (arguing that the Eighth Amendment does not require that the execution
team consist of medical professionals).
161.

Id. at 642 (explaining that it would be too intrusive to require the States to observe
“medical norms”).

162.

See Brown v. Beck, No. 06-3018, 2006 WL 3914717, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006)
(permitting execution to proceed “on the condition that there are present and accessible to Plaintiff throughout the execution personnel with sufficient medical
training to ensure Plaintiff is in all respects unconscious prior to and at the time of
the administration” of the lethal drugs).

163.

See, e.g., David E. Longnecker et al., Anesthesiology 85 (2007).

164. Brown v. Beck, 445 F.3d 752, 754-55 (4th Cir. 2006) (Michael, J., dissenting) (recounting extensive evidence that the use of a BIS monitor in isolation is inappropriate and that the State had offered “scant evidence” to rebut plaintiff’s compelling proffer).
165.

See Brown v. Beck, No. 06-3018, slip op. at 4-5 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 17, 2006) (accusing
plaintiff of trying to “force a conflict of medical ethics” and accepting the State’s
proposed remedy instead of the court’s initial order).
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the services of an anesthesiologist would, in fact, be difficult. Instead, it
accepted a manifestly inferior remedy that, on its own, did not correct the dangers the court itself had identified.
Even though federalism concerns are heightened when federal courts
review state procedures, such remedial anxieties are not limited to federal
courts reviewing state execution procedures. Like the North Carolina district
court in Beck, a Florida state court issued a remedy against the state only to
change its mind. The lower court initially expressed concern that Florida’s
revised lethal injection procedure did not “adequately address the events that
took place during the Diaz execution.”166 The court ordered the state to revise
its lethal injection procedures in numerous ways, such as improving training,
including contingency plans, and periodically reviewing DOC procedures.167
When Florida objected and submitted a protocol with only superficial revisions,
the court backed down and approved it.168 Indeed, the court backtracked on its
initial factual assertions and denied that the Diaz execution had been botched,
notwithstanding its previous ruling that the state had not adequately addressed
the problems that had arisen during that execution.169 As in Beck, the court did
not explain why the state’s minor revisions obviated the need for the remedy
the court had initially ordered. Yet, by accepting the state’s suggested remedy
and abandoning its own initial order, the court effectively limited the value of
the Eighth Amendment right.
In affirming, the Florida Supreme Court emphasized the burden any court
ordered remedy would impose. Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Florida’s
training of personnel was inadequate, the court stated that its “role is not to micromanage the executive branch in fulfilling its own duties relating to executions.”170 Lest the court be tempted to supplant the political branches’ judgment
with its own, it adopted a “presumption of deference” that “the methodology
and the chemicals to be used are matters best left to the Department of Corrections.”171 In other words, remedial concerns were so powerful that the court presumptively deferred to the DOC without any evidence about the execution
protocol itself. Such language indicated to future courts that judicial involvement in this area is presumptively illegitimate and that even future claims with
more compelling evidence of serious risks and viable alternatives should be
similarly dismissed.
Federal appellate courts also sometimes focus on remedial issues. After
holding Missouri’s procedure unconstitutional, the district court in Taylor
required that the state employ an anesthesiologist to monitor the inmate’s anes166. See Florida v. Lightbourne, No. 81-170, slip op. at 3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 31, 2007).
167.

Id. at 3-4.

168.

See id. at 5 (denying relief).

169. Id. at 3.
170.

Lightborne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 351 (Fla. 2007).

171.

Id. at 352 (quoting Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000)).
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thetic depth.172 The theory was that an anesthesiologist would know if an inmate
has been sufficiently anesthetized before the administration of the pancuronium and potassium, thus protecting him from errors that might occur
during the procedure.173 In imposing this remedy, the district court was not
claiming that the Eighth Amendment always required the participation of an
anesthesiologist. Instead, it reasoned that the state’s haphazard approach to
lethal injection created a significant risk of excruciating pain and that the inclusion of a trained professional was a reasonable requirement to protect the
inmate from pain, especially given the misadventures of Dr. Doerhoff and the
other unqualified, untrained team members. The remedy arose not directly
from the Eighth Amendment but from the court’s remedial discretion, which
was triggered by particular facts giving rise to the constitutional violation.
The Eighth Circuit reversed, emphasizing the state’s “broad discretion” to
design execution procedures.174 Executions, the Eighth Circuit reminded the
district court, are not medical procedures, and “no State can carry out an
execution in the same manner that a hospital monitors an operation.”175 Thus,
the Eighth Circuit explained, the requirement that Missouri use an anesthesiologist during its executions went far beyond what the Constitution required.176
In emphasizing that the Constitution did not require the remedy imposed
by the district court, the Eighth Circuit was stating a correct proposition of constitutional law, but it was also ignoring the applicable standard of review and
the district court’s reasoning. In the Eighth Circuit and elsewhere, remedies imposed by trial courts are reviewed for an abuse of discretion,177 a standard of
review the court of appeals did not mention once. In opting not to cite or follow the applicable standard of review, the Eighth Circuit not only indicated its
determination to reverse the district court but also missed the point. Remedies
imposed to correct constitutional violations are rarely constitutionally required
in the abstract. To the contrary, trial courts exercise discretion to fashion

172.

Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8 (W.D. Mo. June 26,
2006).

173.

Id. at *7-8.

174.

Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing McKenzie v.
Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1469 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

175.

Id. at 1084 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

176.

Id.; see also Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 910 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that
the Constitution does not require the State to hire an anesthesiologist for each
execution); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1469 (“[W]e are aware of no authority for the
proposition that the prisoner is entitled, for example, to have a lethal injection
administered by a physician.”); Hamilton v. Jones, 472 F.3d 814, 816 (10th Cir.
2007) (same).

177.

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Smith v. Ark.
Dep’t of Corr. 103 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 1996).
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remedies based on the nature of the violation.178 In other words, the anesthesiologist requirement might be inappropriate in a different state with different
facts, but the district court determined that it made sense in Missouri. The
Eighth Circuit ignored this argument, focusing instead on the correct but legally
irrelevant proposition that the district court’s chosen remedy was not constitutionally required.
Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit transitioned from its rejection of the
remedy to its factual conclusion that “Mr. Taylor has not adduced evidence at
any stage of this litigation that carries his burden of proving a constitutional
violation.”179 In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit nowhere explained
why it found the district court’s factual conclusions unconvincing and again
evaded the standard of review.180 Indeed, after perfunctorily citing in its introduction the “clear error” standard for a district court’s factual findings after a
bench trial, the Eighth Circuit did not refer to it again. Instead, it leapt from its
discussion of the district court’s remedy immediately to its single-paragraph
announcement that the district court’s factual findings were wrong and that
there was therefore no Eighth Amendment violation. This cursory discussion,
however, ignored the district court’s actual findings, particularly its extensive
analysis of the dangers posed by Dr. Doerhoff and his unqualified execution
team. The court of appeals, thus, reversed the lower court by glossing over the
very facts that had given rise to a violation.181
This is questionable legal analysis, but it is also instructive, because it illustrates the extent to which remedial concerns inform courts’ rulings on the constitutional right. In this regard, the Eighth Circuit’s approach is hardly unusual.
The Eighth Circuit felt that the remedy imposed by the district court was too
burdensome on the state, and its discussion of the remedy necessarily colored
its view of the right itself.182 Its leap from remedy to right may have been inart-

178.

See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978) (emphasizing that the district
court has “ample authority” to fashion remedies based on the “severity” of established violations); Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (“Once a right and a violation have been
shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”).

179.

Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1085.

180. See, e.g., Robinson v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1096, 1101 (8th Cir. 2006) (articulating a clear error standard of review of the trial court’s factual findings).
181.

The court focused instead on the written protocol’s vague assurance of a qualified
team, even though the State never indicated it was adding qualified personnel to
the team the lower court had already deemed unqualified. See Taylor, 487 F.3d at
1082-85 (arguing that the “written protocol” does not present unconstitutional
risk of pain but ignoring facts about Missouri’s execution team).

182.

Cf. Rutherford v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[F]ederal
courts considering equitable relief must be ‘sensitive to the State’s strong interest
in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue interference from the federal
courts . . . .’” (quoting Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006))).
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ful, but its conflation of the two was nothing extraordinary, sharply limiting the
value of the Eighth Amendment in practice, without actually claiming to eviscerate the right. In short, “the threat of undesirable remedial consequences
motivate[d] [the] court[] to construct the right in such a way as to avoid those
consequences.”183
3.

Concerns About Delay

Closely related to remedies is the problem of delay. Sometimes § 1983
actions challenging the method of execution force a stay delaying the date of
execution while the court hears the case.184 Courts are usually extremely sensitive to this concern. Telling the state to wait to carry out its sentence seems almost as invasive as ordering it to reform its institutional practices. Similarly,
just as a court draws on its equitable powers in crafting a remedy, so too do
equitable concerns guide its decision of whether or not to issue a stay delaying
an execution.185 Predictably, then, just as courts are reluctant to exercise their
equitable powers to impose a remedy telling states what to do, they are also cautious about issuing any order interfering with the expeditious execution of a
death sentence.186
Courts, though, are not precise about exactly what—the lawsuit itself, the
contemplated remedy, or something else—would trigger the delay. Some suggest that merely permitting the litigation to go forward is itself a form of
relief.187 These courts assume that the litigation’s sole or primary goal is to prolong the inmate’s life—particularly when the suit has been filed relatively soon
before a scheduled execution—and they dismiss the case accordingly.188 This
183.

Levinson, supra note 117, at 885.

184.

See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, No. 06-1397 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2006) (en banc) (granting Taylor’s rehearing petition and application for stay); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F.
Supp. 2d 972, 974-78 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (recounting the case’s history including
execution stay).

185.

See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649 (2004) (“A stay is an equitable remedy,
and ‘[e]quity must take into consideration the State’s strong interest in proceeding with its judgment and . . . attempt[s] at manipulation.’” (quoting Gomez v.
United States Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992))).

186.

See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (plurality opinion) (arguing that
the finding of a violation would require endless rounds of litigation “touting a
new and improved methodology”); McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1172 (11th Cir.
2008) (expressing concern over federal court involvement in state-administered
executions); Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (states have
a “significant interest in meting out a sentence of death in a timely fashion”
(quoting Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644 (2004))).

187.

See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1506 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Each delay, for its span, is a commutation of a death sentence to one of imprisonment.”).

188.

See, e.g., Berry v. Epps, 506 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Our precedent requires
the dismissal of ‘eleventh hour’ dilatory claims . . . .”); Grayson v. Allen, 491 F.3d
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dismissal can effectively make it impossible for inmates to protect themselves
against dangerous execution methods. It is true that these suits can cause delay,
but death row inmates cannot realistically challenge their method of execution
far in advance. Indeed, when inmates have tried to do so, the state has argued
persuasively that such early challenges should be dismissed as unripe, because
the state may change its own protocol before the plaintiff’s execution date.189
Plaintiffs thus confront a catch-22: early claims can be dismissed as unripe, later
claims as dilatory.
Delay does impose costs on states, both financial (resulting primarily from
renewed litigation) and political (resulting from the inability to execute a lawfully-imposed sentence). Given these costs, it is understandable that courts
weigh delay when determining whether to grant relief, especially when inmates
file claims just weeks or even hours before their scheduled executions. Nevertheless, courts often assume that these claims are disingenuous and treat them
as though their sole or primary purpose is to delay. While this assumption may
sometimes be correct, some courts seem to assume this motive before they look
closely at the evidence. As a result, courts sometimes over-emphasize the
significance of delay, treating it like a decisive factor rather than one cost to be
1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (“If Grayson truly had intended to challenge Alabama’s
lethal injection protocol, he would not have deliberately waited to file suit until a
decision on the merits would be impossible without entry of a stay or an expedited litigation schedule.”); Harris v. Johnson, 376 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“By waiting as long as he did, Harris leaves little doubt that the real purpose behind his claim is to seek a delay of his execution . . . .”).
There is some truth to the view that such litigation is sometimes a delaying
tactic, but many lethal injection claims are brought by lawyers who are genuinely
concerned about the protocols and appalled that the States have taken so few
measures to understand or improve their methods. Indeed, the fact that several
law firms have chosen to enter these cases in recent years lends credence to this
position; law firms have little interest in expending valuable pro bono resources
by pursuing delay for the sake of delay.
189.

294

See Alley v. Little, 452 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting) (“Had
[plaintiff] attempted to challenge his method of execution before the method had
been chosen, or before he had even been presented with the choice under the
State’s procedure, his challenge would clearly have faced issues of ripeness.”);
Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 583 n.3 (Mo. 2005) (finding that, because “it
is unknown what method, if any, of lethal injection may be utilized by the
State . . . [when] execution date and method are set, it is premature for this Court
to consider whether a particular method of lethal injection violates the Eighth
Amendment”); Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding that a lethal-injection challenge was not “ripe,” because there was no execution date and the “method in which lethal injection is currently administered is
not determinative of the way it will be administered at the moment of appellant’s
execution”); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring that factual contentions have
likely evidentiary support); Defs’ 11/8/2006 Motion To Strike, United States v.
Higgs (D. Md. 2006) (No. 98-0520) (U.S. government arguing that plaintiff’s
method-of-execution challenge was unripe because execution was not imminent).
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weighed equitably.190 To the extent that delay sometimes obstructs a court from
ever considering the merits of a constitutional claim, this outcome is troubling:
it is odd to think that such equitable concerns should necessarily trump constitutional ones. However, when courts dismiss lethal injection claims because of
the delay they create without examining the extent of or reason for the delay or
the potential merits of the action, they subordinate the Eighth Amendment
right to non-constitutional equities. In so doing, courts dismiss potentially
meritorious claims with barely a glance at the relevant facts and law.191
Similarly, courts’ instinct to blame the plaintiff for any delay ignores the extent to which fault often lies with the state.192 As Justice Stevens pointed out,
“[s]tates wishing to decrease the risk that future litigation will delay executions . . . would do well to reconsider their continued use of pancuronium bromide.”193 Stevens’s advice stems from the fact that, without the paralytic, it
would be much easier to determine during an execution whether inmates were
suffering pain. Pancuronium makes it probable that problems during an execution will go undetected. Without it, states could win these cases much more
quickly by pointing to apparently peaceful executions as indication of unproblematic procedures.
Indeed, as Judge Fogel summarized, were states’ main objective to resume
executions, “their unwillingness to see the situation for what it is and to be proactive is self-defeating.”194 Basic protocol changes would have avoided much
litigation. The one-drug protocol, for example, is painless and therefore comparatively immune from a colorable Eighth Amendment challenge and its ac-

190. See, e.g., Berry, 506 F.3d at 404 (requiring dismissal for “eleventh hour” claim regardless of the merits or reasons for delay).
191.

It is true that equitable concerns frequently guide courts’ approaches to cases
(constitutional or otherwise), so it is understandable and appropriate that concerns about delay would be part of courts’ calculus and would even be decisive in
the case of some last-minute actions. It is harder to understand, though, why an
equitable factor like delay should receive so much weight that constitutional
claims are treated sometimes as presumptively bogus, even in cases where the suit
was not filed at the last minute or could not have been filed earlier, such as when
an inmate challenges a recently adopted or revised execution procedure. See
Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 328 n.2, 352 (Fla. 2007) (adopting the
presumption that lethal injection claims are invalid in a case with no outstanding
death warrant challenging Florida’s procedure after the State implemented
changes to its execution protocol following the botched Diaz execution).

192.

See, e.g., Cooey v. Taft, No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2007 WL 2607583, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
5, 2007) (“Any argument that the granting of an injunction would harm the
State’s interest in fulfilling the judgment . . . in a timely manner is somewhat disingenuous, considering that but for the State’s interlocutory appeal, many if not
all of the underlying issues would in all likelihood have been resolved by now.”).

193.

Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1546 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).

194. See Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 982 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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companying delays.195 Death row inmates could, of course, challenge even this
procedure, but such suits would probably be dismissed quickly. A bogus challenge to a painless procedure would take much less time than a serious challenge to the far more complicated and dangerous three-drug procedure.196
Many courts, however, seem to fear that, were they to intervene, they would be
blamed for stopping executions.197 They therefore treat any delay as an unacceptable interference in state affairs, akin to constitutional remedies stipulating
the specific allocation of state resources. In so doing, they implicitly limit the
practical value of the underlying constitutional right.
B. The Structural Injunction’s Shadow over Lethal Injection
To make sense of why remedial concerns have so influenced courts in these
cases, it is helpful to situate them in the broader context of public law litigation.
Many judges today are acutely sensitive to accusations that courts tread too
heavily on the democratic branches. This sensitivity is, in part, a result of a
backlash against what has been seen as excessive judicial intervention in structural reform litigation and also a reflection of more restrained judicial values
generally.
The structural reform suit is “one in which a judge, confronting a state
bureaucracy over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure
the organization to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present institutional arrangements.”198 Structural reform litigation, then, often seeks to
revamp the practices of large state bureaucracies. School desegregation and
prison conditions actions are archetypal structural reform cases.199
Lethal injection cases are not structural reform suits, and most courts do
not say that they are. (Most courts do not reach the remedial stage of lethal
injection litigation, so they are also not terribly precise about exactly how
remedial concerns affect their decision-making.) There are, nevertheless, features of lethal injection actions that bring to mind courts’ concerns in more
195.

Even skeptics of the one-drug protocol do not allege that it causes pain. See, e.g.,
Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1541 (Alito, J., concurring) (raising concerns about the one-drug
protocol, but not that it causes pain); infra notes 313-314 and accompanying text.

196. See infra Subsection IV.A.1 (discussing the one-drug alternative).
197.

See McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1172 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has
repeatedly admonished courts regarding their obligation to guard against litigation brought solely for the purpose of delay.”); Emmett v. Johnson, 489 F. Supp.
2d 543, 551-52 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“To unsettle these expectations [in timely disposition of sentences] is to inflict a profound injury to the powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty . . . .” (quoting Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538,
556 (1998)) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

198.

Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1979).

199. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. et al., Civil Rights Actions: Enforcing the Constitution 849-51 (2d ed. 2007).
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sweeping structural reform actions. For example, executions take place in prisons, a context in which courts usually are especially deferential because institutional security should be left to prison officials, not unknowledgeable judges.200
Additionally, the scientific and medical angle of lethal injection is far outside
judges’ expertise.201 Although structural reform cases do not necessarily implicate scientific issues, they frequently do involve complicated policy determinations that, like scientific inquiries, are deemed beyond judicial expertise.202
There is also the aforementioned concern that the litigation will delay executions, thus interfering with the state’s substantive and democratic decision to
have the death penalty. Furthermore, like much structural reform litigation,
many lethal injection actions have multiple plaintiffs since all death row inmates in a state are affected by the litigation.203 Some inmates have sought to
intervene in ongoing lethal injection cases,204 while others have even banded together to file a class action.205

200. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362 (1981) (“[C]ourts have been especially deferential to prison authorities in the adoption and execution of policies
and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (same); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (“[F]ederal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude
towards problems of prison administration . . . . [T]he problems of prisons in
America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily
susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the
province of the legislative and executive branches of government.”).
201. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (plurality opinion) (dismissing a judicial approach that would “embroil the courts in ongoing scientific controversies
beyond their expertise”); cf. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (explaining that in examining an agency determination “at the frontiers of science . . . a reviewing court must generally be at its most
deferential”).
202. See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635, 641 (1982).
203. See, e.g., Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1520; Walker v. Epps, No. 07-176, 2008 WL 2095704
(N.D. Miss. May 16, 2008); Cooey v. Strickland, No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2008 WL 471536
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2008); Bowling v. Haas, No. 07-cv-07, 2007 WL 403875 (E.D.
Ky. Jan. 31, 2007); Anderson v. Evans, No. 05-0825, 2006 WL 83093 (W.D. Okla.
Jan. 11, 2006); Complaint, Roane v. Gonzales, No. 05-2337 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2005).
204. See, e.g., Clemons v. Crawford, No. 07-4129, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 4, 2007)
(granting motion to intervene).
205. See Jackson v. Danberg, 240 F.R.D. 145, 147-49 (D. Del. 2007) (granting plaintiffs’
motion to be certified as a class action for their lethal injection suit); see also 2
Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution 350 (2d
ed. 1993) (describing structural reform cases as tending to involve more parties).
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Finally, and most importantly, lethal injection litigation, like structural injunction suits, seeks to reform the way a state carries out its duties and thus intrudes on the state’s policy-making prerogative.206 These cases implicate personnel, training, drugs, architecture, drug administration apparatuses,
monitoring, recordkeeping, and contingency plans. Given lethal injection’s
complicated design, some courts finding problems have retained jurisdiction to
ensure compliance, a tactic commonly employed by courts in structural reform
actions.207 To this extent, lethal injection suits implicate structural concerns,
seeking to revise the very structures and processes by which the state carries out
the death penalty. Thus, even though courts rarely suggest that lethal injection
actions are a form of structural reform litigation, the judiciary’s general reluctance to impose structural injunctions in recent decades likely plays into its
similar remedial anxieties in lethal injection cases. Indeed, as concerns about
judicial involvement in public affairs have increased, there has been an increased tendency to regard with suspicion any constitutional remedy against the
state.208
This increased suspicion grows out of the large scope of many structural reform cases. The typical structural injunction case seeks to remedy alleged constitutional violations by reforming the everyday workings of large public institutions such as schools, prisons, or mental health hospitals.209 As then-Professor
Fletcher explains, this litigation tends to be sprawling with many parties, and
the finding of a constitutional violation is usually only a prelude to a prolonged,
complicated process of devising an order directing the state to reform its institutions.210 Sometimes these remedial decrees are extremely detailed and stipulate, for example, the precise staffing ratios or types and quantities of food to be
served in a prison.211 It is then easy to see why judicial involvement would at206. See 2 Dobbs, supra note 205, at 349 (describing structural injunction cases as civil
rights cases in which the plaintiffs attempt to halt wrongful practices by reforming
social institutions).
207. See Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *9 (W.D. Mo. June 26,
2006) (“The Court will retain jurisdiction over the State’s implementation of the
lethal injection protocol for the next six executions or until the Court is satisfied
that the protocol is being administered in a consistent fashion.”); Morales v.
Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (ordering California to advise
the court within thirty days how long it will take to review and revise execution
protocol); see also 2 Dobbs, supra note 205, at 350 (noting that structural injunctions often involve ongoing judicial administration).
208. See Poser, supra note 109, at 298 (“[T]hose who contend that courts should not be
involved in institutional reform litigation, whether for capacity or legitimacy reasons, focus on the remedial phase of the litigation, as this is where judicial involvement strays from its traditional role.”).
209. Fletcher, supra note 202, at 636.
210. Id. at 638.
211.
298

Id. at 639.

Article - Eric Berger - 28 - Production - 2009.05.15.doc

5/15/2009 1:00 PM

LETHAL INJECTION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

tract criticism; such decrees intrude greatly into the daily operations of a public
institution and judges have little to guide them beyond their own intuition with
respect to such operations. This role moves the judge “far beyond the normal
competence and authority of a judicial officer, into an arena where legal aspirations, bureaucratic possibilities, and political constraints converge, and where
ordinary legal rules frequently are inapplicable.”212
Unsurprisingly, then, by the late 1970s, many scholars, politicians, and
judges began openly questioning whether decrees of this nature were within the
scope of legitimate judicial power.213 Considered especially problematic was judicial intervention in “polycentric” problems, which are “complex problem[s]
with a number of subsidiary problem centers, each of which is related to the
others, such that the solution to each depends on the solution to all the others.”214 Polycentric problems often involve non-legal elements with consequences that extend far beyond the litigation and reach thousands of people.
For example, litigation challenging the constitutionality of state prison conditions presumably seeks a judicial order requiring improvements to the prison
system. But improvements cost money, and additional money spent on prisons
necessarily siphons off money that might otherwise be spent elsewhere.215 Such
judicial involvement is problematic in part because judges’ remedial decrees
usually are guided by their sense of how to remedy the constitutional wrong,
not by other non-legal problems that might arise from the imposition of a particular remedy.216 Even if sensitive to these concerns, a judge is unlikely to account for all of the different interests and expenses. That task is better left to the
political branches, which, after all, manage the budget not just for prisons but
for all social institutions.
There are, thus, good reasons for courts to exercise restraint issuing institutional decrees, and judges have become increasingly skeptical about the merits
of structural reform litigation.217 In practice, this awareness has meant not only
an increased reluctance to impose structural reform injunctions but also often a
limitation of the right itself. If a court focuses on the plaintiffs’ rights, the remedial question becomes whether the defendant has taken the necessary steps to
cure the constitutional violation. But “if the court focuses more on the remedial

212.

Id. at 640-41.

213.

See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 949, 973 (1978) (calling for “heightened judicial sensitivity” to the implications of the “proliferation and regularization of broad institutional relief” issued
by courts).

214.

Fletcher, supra note 202, at 645 (internal quotation marks omitted).

215.

Id. at 646; see also Mishkin, supra note 213, at 965 (“An institutional remedy inevitably involves allocation of state resources, at times in major amounts.”).

216.

Fletcher, supra note 202, at 647.

217.

John C. Jeffries Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 Cal. L.
Rev. 1387, 1410 (2007).
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issue, it will conceive of a remedy in terms of the duty and then consider it implemented when the defendants can demonstrate implementation, or at least a
good faith effort to implement it as far as possible.”218 The remedy, then, has become “part of the definition of the right.”219 Indeed, the more courts focus on
remedial difficulties, the more likely it is that the underlying right will be constrained so that a finding of a violation will become less likely.
Of course, remedy can constrain right in numerous ways, and, in structural
reform litigation, there was often an iterative process in which a series of judicial decisions fleshed out what a constitutional principle required of state actors.220 As we have seen, lethal injection cases have usually proceeded along a
different track: remedial concerns limit the scope of the right in the first instance so that judges never find violations. This limitation is significant because
when courts refer generally to remedial concerns in declining to find a constitutional violation, they are not being precise about exactly why there is no violation. Remedy, then, constrains the right by muddying courts’ analyses, inviting
judges to point vaguely to remedial obstacles rather than to particular facts that
might or might not create a significant risk of pain.221
One should not overstate the importance of structural reform litigation’s
history on lethal injection suits. Although some commentators conclude that
structural reform litigation is “something that is over and done with,”222 the
more accepted view is that structural reform injunction these days is not so
much dead as different—narrower and less intrusive.223 To be sure, some courts
have noted the similarities between lethal injection suits and structural reform
suits,224 but for most courts, the backlash against structural reform injunctions
provides not a direct analogy but a culture in which they approach public law
litigation. Courts these days are hesitant to reach remedial questions, particu-

218.

Poser, supra note 109, at 323-24.

219.

Levinson, supra note 117, at 881.

220. See id. at 874-84 (discussing school desegregation, prison conditions, and apportionment cases).
221.

See supra Section II.A.

222. Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree 10 (2003) (citing
scholars holding this view).
223. See Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s
Still Moving!, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 143 (2003) (arguing that despite the decline of
structural reform litigation, lawsuits seeking judicial decrees governing the admissions criteria of state-run educational institutions resemble such litigation);
Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 550, 602-04 (2006) (arguing that reports of
the death of the structural reform injunction are greatly exaggerated).
224. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531-32 (2008) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 562 (1979)); supra Section II.A (discussing court decisions expressing reluctance to interfere with State execution procedures).
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larly in politically charged cases, such as those involving the death penalty.225 As
we shall see, however, to the extent these factors have dissuaded judicial involvement, courts have misunderstood these cases and the remedial issues they
present.
III. Political Process Failures and the Need for Judicial Intervention
If states took more care in designing their lethal injection procedures,
courts’ inclination to defer to the political branches would have a great deal
more merit. But many states have given little to no consideration to the method
by which they carry out their most solemn duty.226 To the contrary, many states
have haphazardly slapped together a procedure, blindly following other states,
who themselves failed to give real thought to it in the first place. While these
and related shortcomings do not themselves amount to an Eighth Amendment
violation, they collectively result in a political process failure undeserving of judicial deference.227
225. To some extent, this reluctance may be because some courts have not internalized
the extent to which structural reform injunctions today can be “less intrusive . . . .
[t]ypically avoid[ing] the ‘kitchen sink’ approach to institutional reform in favor
of orders that identify goals the defendants are expected to achieve . . . .” Jeffries &
Rutherglen, supra note 217, at 1411-12; see also Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L.
Rev. 1016, 1019 (2004) (arguing that a new experimental injunction “combines
more flexible and provisional norms with procedures for ongoing stakeholder
participation and measured accountability”).
226. The following discussion summarizes common ways in which State governments
have enacted lethal injection procedures; it does not argue that each State’s behavior conforms exactly to the general approaches summarized here.
227. By “political process failure,” I refer collectively to a series of legislative, executive,
and administrative failings, including democratically elected legislative and executive officials’ failure to participate in the design of the procedure; delegation by
those elected officials to unelected DOC officials; further delegation by unelected
DOC officials to unelected, unqualified, and untrained execution team members;
a failure by both elected and unelected officials to consult experts; a lack of oversight by both elected and unelected officials; a lack of transparency, including a
refusal to share the details of the procedure with either litigants or the general
public; harm to a “discrete and insular” minority group lacking political power;
and a refusal to reconsider the protocol and subject it to normal administrative
procedures, even as serious problems have come to light. I am, in other words, using the term “political process failure” in a broader way than it is used when referring to voting rights and other election-related issues.
It is also worth noting that while my discussion of “political process failures”
exceeds the precise terms of footnote four of Carolene Products, see United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), some lethal injection procedures arguably would receive heightened scrutiny under any of footnote four’s
theories. First, the procedures trigger a specific provision of the Bill of Rights (the
Eighth Amendment). Second, while some of the legislative and administrative
301
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The basic narrative of the development of lethal injection in the United
States is now well known. In 1977 Oklahoma became the first state to adopt lethal injection. State legislators consulted with Jay Chapman, the chief medical
examiner for Oklahoma. Even though Chapman’s “first response was that [he]
was an expert in dead bodies but not an expert in getting them that way,” he
quickly changed course and declared, “[t]o hell with them: let’s do this
thing.”228 Chapman and two legislators then quickly drafted the statute, which
focused on the types of drugs to use, not the details of administration. The resulting protocol did not require execution teams to include trained personnel.
Nor was it ever scientifically studied.229 Chapman today expresses shock that lethal injection is not performed by doctors but by individuals with little understanding of the dangers posed by the drugs.230 As he now puts it, “it never occurred to me when we set this up that we’d have complete idiots administering
the drugs.”231
The Oklahoma legislature passed the bill, and it was then copied—first by
Texas and then by other states.232 From 1977 to 2002, thirty-seven state legislatures adopted Oklahoma’s brand of lethal injection, but they did so without
conducting their own evaluation of the procedure’s risks. Instead, they delegated the procedure to unelected officials who mimicked Oklahoma’s choices
without actually examining the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure.233 As Dr. Zimmers and Dr. Koniaris argue, “no research whatsoever—
clinical, veterinary, medical literature search, or other—was ever performed” at

failings I discuss are likely not fully encompassed by the footnote’s concern with
legislation restricting political processes, the States’ deliberate lack of transparency
does render it unlikely that usual political processes could be expected to identify,
much less fix, the problems. Third, the procedures uniquely burden a “discrete
and insular” minority (death row inmates) that would be unlikely to protect itself
through normal political processes. See id.
228. Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 66 (quoting E-mail from A. Jay Chapman,
Forensic Pathologist, Santa Rosa, Cal., to Deborah W. Denno, Professor of Law,
Fordham Law Sch. (Jan. 18, 2006)); William J. Wiseman, Jr., Confessions of a Former Legislator, Christian Century, June 20-27, 2001, at 7.
229. Denno, Paradox, supra note 28, at 90-120; Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 70.
Of course, the protocol could not be tested on humans, but States could have
studied the dangers associated with each of the drugs.
230. See Human Rights Watch, So Long as They Die: Lethal Injections in the
United States 33 (2006).
231.

Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (quoting E-mail
from A. Jay Chapman, Forensic Pathologist, Santa Rosa, Cal. to Deborah W.
Denno, Professor of Law, Fordham Law Sch. (Jan. 18, 2006)).

232. Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 78.
233.
302
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any level of government when states adopted lethal injection.234 As one trial
court summarized, “there is scant evidence that ensuing States’ adoption of lethal injection was supported by any additional medical or scientific studies . . . .
Rather . . . the various States simply fell in line relying solely on Oklahoma’s
protocol . . . .”235
Some states’ statutes reflect this haphazard adoption, failing even to state
accurately the actual drugs used. Several state statutes, for instance, refer only to
a barbiturate and paralytic, leaving out reference to potassium chloride, even
though the protocol in practice does include potassium.236 Other state statutes
vaguely authorize the use of lethal drugs without specifying which ones.237
South Dakota recently rewrote its statute along these lines to make it vaguer so
as to give its corrections department more flexibility.238 When the legislature deliberately makes a statute vaguer in order to punt authority entirely to unelected
prison officials, who themselves are unqualified and not inclined to seek expert
advice,239 courts should not defer to that same legislature merely because it has
been democratically elected. In such instances, Baze’s warning that a judicially
imposed remedy “would substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in
implementing their execution procedures”240 rings hollow.
234. Teresa A. Zimmers & Leonidas G. Koniaris, Peer-Reviewed Studies Identifying
Problems in the Design and Implementation of Lethal Injection for Execution, 35
Fordham Urb. L.J. 919, 921 (2008).
235.

Baze v. Rees, No. 04-CI-01094, slip op. at 2 (Ky. Cir. Ct. July 8, 2005), aff’d, 217
S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006), aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008); see also Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 78-79 (providing a history of the development and spread of lethal
injection in the United States).

236. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-617(a)(1) (2006) (“The punishment of death is to
be administered by a continuous intravenous injection of a lethal quantity of an
ultra-short-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent until the defendant’s death is pronounced.”); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2716 (2008)
(same); Md. Code Ann., [Corr. Servs.] § 3-905 (West 2008) (same); Miss. Code
Ann. § 99-19-51 (2007) (same); Mont. Code. Ann. § 46-19-103 (2007) (same);
N.M. Stat. § 31-14-11 (2008) (same); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-187 (2007) (same);
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1014(A) (2003) (same); Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at
94 & n.306.
237.

See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-704 (2009) (“The penalty of death shall be
inflicted by an intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death, under the supervision of the state department of corrections.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(f) (2008) (proscribing similar guidelines); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-38 (2008) (proscribing similar guidelines); Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 43.14 (Vernon 2009) (proscribing similar guidelines).

238. See S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-32 (2006) (amended 2007); Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 94 & nn.304 & 307 (discussing South Dakota’s revised statute).
239. See infra notes 270-272 and accompanying text.
240. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (plurality opinion).
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Many states’ refusal to disclose the details of their own procedures compounds the problem. As recently as October 2007, only six lethal injection states
provided what Professor Denno termed “complete” public protocols,241 and
even those protocols did not give details about important information such as
the qualifications and training of the execution team members. This lack of
transparency makes it nearly impossible for the public to understand a lethal
injection procedure’s risks, thereby insulating it from democratic revision.242
Relatedly, states also routinely resist discovery in an effort to divulge as little
information about the method by which they plan to execute the plaintiff.243
Courts are often complicit, reluctant to impose discovery burdens on states and
sensitive to concerns about the executioners’ anonymity.244 While executioner
anonymity is certainly a legitimate state interest, it is not a sound reason for denying plaintiffs’ discovery requests, since sensitive material can be redacted and
subject to protective orders forbidding the public disclosure of information that
might reveal an executioner’s identity.245
When details do come to light, the record often highlights the failed processes and delegations by which the protocol was adopted and retained. In some
states, neither elected politicians nor DOC officials played a role in designing

241.

Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 95. The States Denno cites are Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington. Id.

242. Id. at 96; see also Adam Liptak, After Flawed Executions, States Resort to Secrecy,
N.Y. Times, July 30, 2007, at A9 (“In the wake of several botched executions
around the nation, often performed by poorly trained workers, you might think
that we would want to know more, not less, about the government employees
charged with delivering death on behalf of the state.”).
243. See supra notes 79-80, 91 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Moeller v. Weber, No. 04-4200, 2008 WL 1957842 (D.S.D. May 2, 2008)
(denying in part plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery); Timberlake v. Donahue,
No. 06-1859, 2007 WL 141950, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2007) (ordering that execution team members testify in a manner to preserve anonymity, and that “plaintiff
will endeavor to eliminate or reduce the desired need for any such testimony”);
Moore v. Rees, No. 06-22, 2007 WL 1035013, at *10 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007)
(granting plaintiff’s motion to depose the execution team, but noting defendant’s
“strong interest in preserving the safety, and hence anonymity” of the team members); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1236660, at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 5,
2006) (denying plaintiff’s motion to reconsider denial of discovery request for
depositions and limit access to only six of sixty-six past execution records); Hill v.
McDonough, No. 06-032, 2006 WL 2556938, at *2 n.5 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2006)
(suggesting that because Florida State Court had already ruled on a lethal injection challenge in 2000, plaintiff was not entitled to discovery about the procedure
as it existed in 2006).
245. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (stating that court may issue protective orders); see also
Moeller, 2008 WL 1957842, at *4 (allowing State to submit sensitive materials for in
camera review); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 31, 2005) (granting protective order).
304

Article - Eric Berger - 28 - Production - 2009.05.15.doc

5/15/2009 1:00 PM

LETHAL INJECTION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

the procedure, and yet often those same officials fought vigorously to retain the
status quo. In Missouri, for example, Dr. Doerhoff boasted that he was responsible for the entire procedure because the DOC director “has no background”
in either medicine or corrections and was therefore “totally dependent on me
advising him what could and should and will be done.”246 Furthermore, because
Missouri had no written protocol, there were “no checks and balances or oversight” on Doerhoff’s capricious judgment.247 Doerhoff, an independent contractor, thus had complete discretion to change the procedure “at a moment’s notice.”248 This discretion included the authority to lower the thiopental doses,
even though his dyslexia rendered him unable to calculate dosages accurately.249
The Missouri legislature then delegated the matter to the DOC director, who in
turn delegated it to Dr. Doerhoff. At no step along the way did Missouri inquire
whether it was delegating the issue to someone with the requisite expertise.
Despite these serious problems and the accompanying lack of accountability, Missouri fought vigorously to retain its existing lethal injection procedure
and never took the initiative to improve it. Even after Judge Gaitan required
Missouri to submit a revised protocol, the new protocol was conceived not by
DOC officials, execution team members, or medical experts, but by legal counsel.250 This approach reflects Missouri’s concern with secrecy over safety. By
turning over the new protocol to lawyers, Missouri did not consult experts in a
meaningful way, but it could claim that the details regarding the new procedure’s adoption were subject to attorney-client privilege.251
Predictably, although the new product did include some improvements (at
least it was in writing), it did not remove the fundamental flaws that had
prompted the court to find a violation in the first place.252 Most bafflingly, Missouri refused to cut ties with Doerhoff, despite his admitted dyslexia, his unapologetic sua sponte changes to the procedure, and a public reprimand for failing to disclose more than twenty malpractice suits against him.253 Instead, the
state actually argued that it should be permitted to keep Doerhoff, reiterating its

246. Doe Deposition, supra note 39, at 63-64. DOC officials confirmed that they “depended on [Doerhoff] heavily.” Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, 367-68.
247. Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *4, *7.
248. Id. at *7.
249. See id. at *5 (citing Doe Deposition, supra note 39); supra Section I.A.
250. Defendants’ 9/11/2007 Responses to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories, Clemons v. Crawford, No. 07-4129 (W.D. Mo. May 1, 2008).
251.

Id.

252. See Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2006) (noting that Eighth Amendment standards can be met in various ways but that State’s
revised protocols “fall short of those standards”).
253.

See Missouri Proposed Execution Protocol 1 (July 14, 2006) (discussing execution
team members and not renouncing Doerhoff); Kohler, supra note 42.
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full “confidence” in his “capabilities.”254 When the DOC finally relented months
later and announced that it would comply with the court’s ruling barring Doerhoff’s participation, it made no effort to find qualified people to take his place,
even though the record made clear that nobody else on the Missouri execution
team knew “anything about” the procedure.255 It would be a perverse theory of
democracy that would afford the state deference under these circumstances.
California has a similar record, only ostensibly addressing problems that
have come to light.256 After the state failed to set an intravenous line properly
during one execution, it assured the district court that it had learned its “lesson”
and that that error “will never occur again.”257 As the court later pointed out,
though, California “did not take steps sufficient to ensure that a similar or
worse problem would not occur,” choosing instead to “tweak” its procedure
rather than engage in substantive revisions.258 The result was that “the questions
[about the procedure’s safety] have become even more substantial.”259 The California execution team’s obdurate attitudes are perhaps best summed up by one
team member’s reaction after an apparently botched execution: “shit does happen, so.”260 And yet its “tweaks” provided the illusion of real revision, thereby
helping to protect the procedure from democratic review.
Indeed, even legitimate efforts to improve the procedure were made in secrecy without democratic deliberation. Following the court’s rulings, the California DOC began erecting a new execution chamber to correct some of its procedure’s problems. (California uses its old lethal gas chamber for lethal
injection, creating unique architectural difficulties, such as IV bags placed too

254. See Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, at 353, 356, 360, 387-89 (testimony of
DOC officials); Brief of Petioner-Appellant at 45, Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d
1072 (8th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1397).
255.

See Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2006) (barring Doerhoff); Letter from G. Anders to M. Gans, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (April 24, 2008) (discussing the State’s removal of
Doerhoff without finding new personnel with medical qualifications); Doe Deposition, supra note 39, at 22.
Despite Judge Gaitan’s ruling barring Dr. Doerhoff from participation in Missouri executions, Doerhoff has continued to participate in federal and Arizona
executions. See Michael Kiefer, Doctor Banned from Executions in Mo. Now in Az.,
Ariz. Republic, July 24, 2008, available at http://www.azcentral.com/
arizonarepublic/news/articles/2008/07/24/20080724deathpenaltydoc0724.html;
Henry Weinstein, Doctor Barred by State Helps in U.S. Executions, L.A. Times,
Nov. 16, 2007, at A17 [hereinafter Weinstein, Doctor Barred].

256. See supra Section I.A.
257.

Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (2006).

258. Id. at 977-79.
259. Id. at 980.
260. Id. at 979 n.8.
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high on walls for the execution team to verify whether the equipment is properly working.261) But the DOC never informed the state legislature of these plans
and expenses. When the legislature found out, it complained that it had not
been informed, halting work on the new facility.262 Even if the DOC deserves
some commendation for seeking to build an improved facility, its decision to
keep secret its plans and bypass the California legislature further demonstrates
that these procedures escape the usual democratic processes. In fact, it was not
even clear that the newly designed facility would cure the problems identified by
the district court.263 Judge Fogel, for his part, sought to address the transparency
problem by placing responsibility with Governor Schwarzenegger, who
promptly insisted on reviewing the protocol in secrecy.264
Even when states agree to review their entire approach to executions, those
efforts have often been cynical. In Tennessee, for instance, Governor Bredesen
revoked apparently-problematic lethal injection protocols so that the Commissioner of Corrections could examine Tennessee’s three-drug procedure. Commissioner Little appointed a Protocol Committee, which consulted with two
anesthesiologists, including Dr. Mark Dershwitz, a lethal injection expert who
has testified as the states’ expert in several cases around the country.265 The Protocol Committee later presented a report summarizing the relative merits of different approaches and stressing the one-drug protocol’s simplicity and reduced
chance of error.266 Emphasizing physician unanimity on the one-drug protocol’s appropriateness and the three-drug protocol’s dangers, the committee recommended that Tennessee switch to the one-chemical protocol.267
Commissioner Little rejected this proposal “within a day or two,” concluding that he did not want “Tennessee to be at the forefront of making the change

261.

Id. at 980.

262. See Henry Weinstein, New Execution Protocol Proposed, L.A. Times, May 16, 2007,
at B1.
263. See, e.g., Testimony Before the California State Senate Public Safety Committee 5
(statement of Professor Ty Alper) (May 8, 2007) (“Despite the fact that a great
deal of money has already been spent on the new construction, it is also not at all
clear whether the new execution chamber even satisfies Judge Fogel’s concerns
about the execution facilities, because the design plans for the partiallyconstructed chamber have not been made public.”).
264. See Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 122. Judge Fogel denied the Governor’s
efforts to keep deliberations about the protocol secret. Id.
265. See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (recounting the
creation of the committee).
266. Id. at 876 (citing the Protocol Committee’s report).
267. Id. at 876-78.
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from the three-drug protocol to the one drug protocol.”268 If Tennessee’s threedrug protocol were declared unconstitutional, it could then consider making
the change. Commissioner Little, an unelected state official, thus rejected the
proposal of a committee that had closely studied the relative merits of the different options. In so doing, he even chose not to add a step that would monitor
the inmate’s consciousness, even though the committee had stressed that the
three-drug protocol would likely require such a measure.269
The Tennessee story is a perfect example of why courts should intervene.
An unelected state official summarily vetoed the recommendations of a committee that had consulted experts and given careful thought to the matter.
Moreover, he did so without consulting his own experts or offering any alternative theory of the evidence. Under such circumstances, none of the usual reasons for deferring to the political branches apply.270 Delegation to unelected officials is not necessarily inappropriate—legislatures delegate authority to
administrative agencies all the time—but typically delegation promises some
degree of agency expertise.271 Where unelected officials lack such expertise and
fail to consult experts themselves, the delegation itself becomes problematic.272

268. Id. at 879-80 (quoting Commissioner Little). Little initially denied that the Protocol Committee had recommended a one-drug protocol, but he ultimately admitted that it had. Id.
269. Id. at 877, 886.
270. Even given the deference afforded to the policy determinations of administrative
agencies, courts will engage in a “hard look” to ensure that such decisions were
based on proper considerations. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency . . . failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem . . . .”); Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971) (holding that court must make a “searching and careful” inquiry to ensure that an agency “decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors”).
271.

See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 115 (1976) (stating that an administrative agency “has an obligation to perform its responsibilities with some
degree of expertise”); Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 61 (1993) (explaining that expertise is a virtue
of bureaucracy and that agencies therefore typically should “understand th[e]
subject matter at least well enough to communicate with substantive experts, to
identify the better experts, and to determine which insights of the underlying discipline can be transformed into workable administrative practices . . . .”); Reuel E.
Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal
Administrative Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 399, 419-21 (2007) (explaining the central
role of agency expertise in defining the deferential judicial role in administrative
law).

272. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1545 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that
DOC officials do not deserve deference when they lack expertise and fail to seek
expert assistance).
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Even when states are ordered to reform flawed procedures, they sometimes
adopt half-measures that purport to fix real problems but in fact do no such
thing and, thus, compound the lack of transparency. As noted above, one trial
court found that North Carolina needed to revise its protocol to provide an anesthesiologist to monitor the inmate.273 The state responded by buying a BIS
monitor.274 The state’s action created the impression that it was addressing the
problem, but anesthesiologists agree that BIS monitors should only be used in
conjunction with, not instead of, other methods.275 Indeed, the BIS monitor is
only useful if it is interpreted by a medical professional with training in anesthesia, which North Carolina did not employ.276 By purchasing a BIS monitor,
then, North Carolina only appeared to address the trial court’s concern that the
inmate may be insufficiently anesthetized. As Professor Denno argues, its objective was to approve a new protocol quickly as opposed to addressing the old
procedure’s real problems.277 Yet, the illusion was convincing enough that the
Fourth Circuit, without comment, let the execution proceed.278 Moreover, this
illusion furthered the political process failure by creating the false impression
that the state was carefully adjusting its procedure to mitigate dangers coming
to light.
Even a state’s use of pancuronium to paralyze inmates contributes to the
political process failure, as it creates the appearance of serenity, even where
there is a torturous death.279 As a result, legislators and other state officials are
far less likely to recognize problems that need to be corrected. Similarly, witnesses at executions usually report that the inmate died serenely.280 Pan273.

See Brown v. Beck, No. 5:06-CT-3018, 2006 WL 3914717, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7,
2006).

274. See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
275.

See Third Affidavit of Dr. Heath at 4, Brown v. Beck, No. 5:06-CT-3018 (E.D.N.C.
Apr. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Third Heath Affidavit] (“It is virtually universally accepted and understood by all anesthesiologists that the BIS monitor and other
brain function monitors cannot be used as the sole method for assessing anesthetic depth.”); Robert Steinbrook, New Technology, Old Dilemma—Monitoring
EEG Activity During Executions, 354 New Eng. J. Med. 2525, 2526 (2006).

276. Third Heath Affidavit, supra note 275, at 3.
277. Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 119.
278. See Brown v. Beck, 445 F.3d 752, 752 (4th Cir. 2006). Such half-hearted reforms are
hardly limited to the States discussed in the text. See, e.g., Denno, Quandary, supra
note 28, at 101 (“Florida’s nonexistent turnaround time in creating a revised protocol implicates the State’s lack of care and consideration of its execution process.”); id. at 100 (explaining that Ohio did not adopt changes it promised following a botched execution).
279. See, e.g., Beyea, supra note 22, at 603; Koniaris et al., supra note 22, at 1414.
280. See, e.g., Adam Buckman, Ted Koppel Saw a Man Executed and Thought . . . How
Humane, How Painless, How Easy, How Simple . . . It Should Be Shown on TV, N.Y.
Post, June 10, 2001, at 113 (“[W]hen it was over, I was shocked and horrified that
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curonium thus creates a false impression about the procedure’s safety that is
difficult to dispel. The resulting misconceptions make it less likely that a state
legislature or even DOC would bother revising the procedure; why would government officials fix something that few people perceive is broken?281
From this perspective, pancuronium not only protects this particular
method of lethal injection from attack but also helps preserve the death penalty
itself. The general public pays little attention to lethal injection procedures, in
part because they usually appear uneventful. One might surmise that if the procedure did not appear peaceful—if all inmates were to convulse and gasp as
Diaz did—public support for the death penalty might suffer.282 As with certain
kinds of speech restrictions, judicial intervention here could be viewed more as
correcting political process failures rather than substantive meddling.283 Were
the pancuronium to minimize the risk of pain or even hasten death, its inclusion in the protocol might be justifiable, but it does not.284 As Justice Stevens
argued, states’ asserted interest in “preserving the dignity of the procedure” is
“woefully inadequate” and “vastly outweighed by the risk that the inmate is actually experiencing excruciating pain that no one can detect.”285

it had been so clinical and so smooth and so easy and that I was less affected by it
than I feared I would be.”); Dara Kam, Victim’s Parents Watch Killer Die, Palm
Beach Post, July 2, 2008, at 1-A (describing an inmate “slip[] away tranquilly”);
Brian Witte, Triple Murderer in Maryland Executed After Supreme Court Rejects
Last-Ditch Appeals, Associated Press Wire, June 18, 2004 (“Witnesses described
the procedure . . . as peaceful and uneventful.”).
281.

Misconceptions about the safety’s procedure also need to be overcome by plaintiffs litigating these claims. Even the most fair-minded judges are skeptical that a
seemingly peaceful death is potentially torturous. See Fogel, supra note 154, at 736
(recounting by the judge that, when he first was assigned a lethal injection case,
his immediate reaction was “extremely skeptical”).

282. Of course, it is impossible to say precisely how public attitudes towards the death
penalty would change, but grotesque convulsions probably would affect at least
some people’s views.
283. Cf. Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 3-16 (2006) (proposing that the judicial role is to interpret the Constitution to further “active liberty” and to intervene most readily during political
process failures); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 111 (1980) (“Where the evil the state is seeking to avert is one that
is thought to arise from the particular dangers of the message being conveyed . . .
the hazards of political distortion and judicial acquiescence are at their peak.”).
284. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1543 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing
the Baze trial court).
285. Id. at 1544 (Stevens, J., concurring). In other words, the “dignity of the procedure”
should not constitute a “legitimate penological justification,” see id. at 1532 (plurality opinion), for refusing to adopt an alternative method in the face of documented advantages over the status quo.
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Given experts’ general agreement that the three-drug protocol as implemented in many states poses unnecessary risks of pain, the question must be
asked why states cling so stubbornly the status quo.286 It is impossible to answer
this question with certainty, but I can speculate. Perhaps some state officials do
not like being told what to do, and their reflexive impulse is to litigate rather
than reform. Perhaps some want death row inmates to suffer a painful death
and even believe there is a democratic mandate for that position.287 More likely,
perhaps officials fear that if they change their procedure, inmates will simply
challenge the new method, resulting in endless rounds of litigation.288 Along
similar lines, in some states, officials may fear that a changed procedure would
require time-consuming legislative revision.289 Another possibility is that state
officials, like most people, do not like giving too much thought to killing people. Some executioners, in fact, have admitted that their role in executions has
taken a significant psychological toll.290
Whatever the reasons, some states have failed to engage carefully with the
complicated procedure they put in place. This failure, of course, creates the risk
that condemned inmates will die an excruciating death, but it also raises serious
concerns about how government behaves when it acts outside public view. The
collective abrogation of responsibility—elected officials’ utter inattention to the
protocol’s design; the delegation to unelected, unqualified personnel; the lack of
transparency and related preference for illusory fixes over real revisions; the refusal to seek expert advice—amounts to a serious political process failure meriting judicial attention. As Justice Stevens argued in his Baze concurrence, “[i]n
the majority of States that use the three-drug protocol, the drugs were selected
by unelected Department of Correction officials with no specialized medical
286. See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 876 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (noting that the
State’s expert, Dershwitz, recommended the one-drug protocol); Deposition of
Dr. Mark Dershwitz at 52-53, 277-79, Jackson v. Danberg, 06-300 (D. Del. Sept. 10,
2007) (reporting from the State’s expert that a one-drug protocol would impose
less risk on the condemned than a three-drug protocol); infra Subsection IV.A.1.
Dr. Dershwitz’s opinions in favor of the one-drug protocol are especially significant because he has testified consistently as the States’ expert.
287. See, e.g., Robert Blecker, But Did They Listen? The New Jersey Death Penalty Commission’s Exercise in Abolitionism: A Reply, 5 Rutgers J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 9, 25
(2007) (arguing that the retributive justification for the death penalty “inflicts justified pain upon a person who earlier inflicted unjustified pain”).
288. But see supra notes 194-197 and accompanying text.
289. For instance, in some states, the use of a paralytic in combination with a barbiturate is prescribed by statute, so a change in procedure would require legislative action. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-617 (2009); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-51
(2008); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1014 (West 2008).
290. See, e.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that
one execution team member was diagnosed and disabled with post-traumatic
stress disorder and found his experience on the execution team to be “the most
stressful responsibility a prison employee ever could have”).
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knowledge and without the benefit of expert assistance or guidance. As such,
their drug selections are not entitled to the kind of deference afforded legislative
decisions.”291 Quite simply, the states’ practices do not deserve judicial deference where, as here, “they are the product of ‘administrative convenience’ and a
‘stereotyped reaction’ to an issue, rather than a careful analysis of relevant considerations favoring or disfavoring a conclusion.”292
Despite all these problems, courts both explicitly and implicitly treat these
procedures as the province of the political branches and immune from judicial
meddling. This approach is misguided, because some states consistently have
proven unwilling and unable to engage with the details of their own procedures.
As Professor Chayes explained, although public law litigation can be intrusive in
that it commands affirmative action of political officers, it ordinarily merely adjusts the manner in which policy is carried forward. In this regard, its target is
generally administrative rather than legislative, focusing on areas where usual
political processes have failed.293 Such failure, Chayes observes, is more likely
where the victims are prisoners or inmates of mental institutions, literally disenfranchised persons with no access to normal legislative processes.294 Death row
inmates, whatever one thinks of them, have no access “to the levers of power in
the system”295 and yet bear the entire burden of the political process failures that
have resulted in a broken process.
Indeed, death row inmates’ lack of political power helps explain the political process failure here. In part because inmates lack power, states have designed their procedures with primary attention to other interests, such as execu-

291.

Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1545 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).

292. Id.
293. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1281, 1315 (1976).
294. Id.; see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that laws burdening “discrete and insular minorities” require a higher
level of judicial scrutiny); Fiss, supra note 198, at 6 (discussing Carolene Products
footnote 4 and arguing that judicial involvement is particularly appropriate when
there is legislative failure such as the victimization of a discrete and insular minority).
295. Chayes, supra note 293, at 1315; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in
Authoritarian Institutions, 32 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 441, 459 (1999) (“Those in the
military, in prisons, and in schools are classic discrete and insular minorities, who
have little political power.”); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote
Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn
About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1079 (1993) (offering a public choice critique of why legislatures fail to attend to the rights of those in the
criminal justice system); James E. Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act: A “Not Exactly,” Equal Protection Analysis, 37 Harv. J. on
Legis. 105, 157 (2000) (arguing that prisoners as a class should be treated as a “discrete and insular minority”).
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tioner anonymity and the witnesses’ experience.296 These are legitimate interests, but, unlike the inmate’s interest in a painless execution, they are not constitutional interests. Of course, courts often consider non-constitutional interests in striking the proper balance for a constitutional rule,297 but where the
right-holder (in this case, the condemned) lacks access “to the levers of power”
and where the state practice threatening the constitutional right is the result of
serious political process failures, courts should not automatically defer to nonconstitutional interests over constitutional ones. Excessive judicial deference is
even more troubling here, because modest revisions could yield much safer protocols.298 In other words, where the right-holder seeks changes that would place
a minor burden on the state and yet yield significant protection to the constitutional right, non-constitutional interests should not trump constitutional ones
absent extraordinary circumstances not present here.
Given many lethal injection states’ failings, there is a lack of an effective alternative to judicial intervention.299 Writing about Taylor v. Crawford, Judge
Gaitan explained that he knew he would need to intervene when he realized that
the state, contrary to his initial assumptions, had taken no reasonable measures
in designing the procedure.300 Interrelated institutional concerns such as federalism, separation of powers, and judicial competence are certainly important
and legitimate, but not when judges invoke them to avoid confronting constitutional problems that will otherwise be ignored because the state actors have abdicated their responsibilities, concealed the details of the relevant policy, and
applied that policy to a population lacking political power.301 Again, in the
normal operation of divided government, norms of judicial restraint serve as
crucial checks on judicial power, but, when taken too far, they inhibit judges
from redressing violations of constitutional norms even when the political
296. See supra text accompanying note 62.
297. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
298. See infra Part IV.
299. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 217, at 1422 (arguing that constitutional
remedies are most justified by the “absence of effective alternatives”).
300. Judge Gaitan explained he had assumed “first, that the state of Missouri had a
written execution protocol; second, that it had been subjected to due diligence before implementation; third, that this protocol was approved by either the legislative and/or executive (Department of Corrections) branches of the Missouri government; and fourth, that trained medical personnel implemented it properly and
consistently. None of these assumptions proved to be true.” Gaitan, supra note
115, at 765.
301.

See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1217-18 (1978) (arguing that federal courts
are sometimes overly concerned with institutional concerns such as federalism
and separation of powers and therefore are inhibited from redressing constitutional violations). But see Levinson, supra note 117, at 924 (arguing that, under
Sager’s theory, all constitutional rights are under-enforced).
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process cannot be trusted to do so. Of course, the political process failures recounted here do not amount to a constitutional violation, but they do belie arguments that courts should defer to the political branches in these cases.302
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that courts’ deference to the political
branches is particularly problematic in the Eighth Amendment context, because
the Eighth Amendment’s legal standard explicitly incorporates other states’
practices.303 Judicial deference to the political branches in an Eighth Amendment case, then, actually encourages those political process failures to perpetuate elsewhere. Confronted with a decision about whether to revise its execution
procedure, a state is likely to copy the common practice rather than to study the
relative merits of the options. Consequently, courts’ unwillingness to confront
the shoddy legislative and administrative procedures by which lethal injection
has been adopted greatly compounds the political process problem, because it
becomes more likely that other states will merely mimic a procedure that, although carelessly adopted, has already received court approval.304
IV. The Modesty of Lethal Injection Remedies
The failed political processes of many states, then, give good reason for judicial intervention. This Part explores the related issue of why that intervention
would be modest and not overly intrusive. Section A discusses particular remedies that courts could impose. In light of these available remedies, Section B argues that courts’ general reluctance to reach the remedial stage in lethal injection actions is misplaced, because these remedies are modest and respectful of
the states. Judicial deference is, therefore, inappropriate—not just because of
302. See Fletcher, supra note 202, at 694 (“The only legitimate basis for a federal judge
to take over the political function in devising or choosing a remedy in an institutional suit is the demonstrated unwillingness or incapacity of the political body.”).
303. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (noting “that it is difficult to regard a
practice as ‘objectively intolerable’ when it is in fact widely tolerated”).
304. One could argue that the prevalence of a given procedure should instead cut in
favor of additional judicial deference, especially given the Eighth Amendment’s
incorporation of common practices. See id. But even if headcounting retains an
important place in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it should not substitute for
review of a method’s safety. To allow a mere headcount of states to confirm the
constitutionality of a painful practice would effectively deny plaintiffs the benefit
of new evidence, suggesting that methods once thought safe are now understood
to cause pain. To this extent, “evolving standards of decency,” see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (citation omitted), must include more than the day’s
most common practice. Compare Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)
(“‘[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment.’” (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002))), with
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (“The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s
legislatures.”).
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the aforementioned political process failures, but also because of the relative
modesty of the potential remedies.
A. Remedial Options
Should a court find that a lethal injection procedure runs afoul of the
Eighth Amendment, it would have a substantial number of remedial possibilities from which to choose. For the judge in this position, these options are, of
course, worth examining. But because courts determine the scope of the right in
light of potential remedies, judges should also think about the remedial options
at the outset of the case. It is, therefore, worth emphasizing that the remedial
alternatives discussed here would not require wholesale revisions of existing
procedures but rather modest adjustments, which would allow states to keep
much of their existing processes in place.
1.

Affirmative Injunctions

Affirmative injunctions order the offending government or official to take
specific action to correct the violation. They are, therefore, generally seen as
more intrusive than negative injunctions, which instead forbid the actor from
continuing the unconstitutional practice. Whereas the negative injunction
leaves it to government officials to decide how to correct the violation, affirmative injunctions dictate precise measures the officials must take.305
Affirmative injunctions, though, have their advantages and have been used
recently by some courts finding Eight Amendment violations.306 In states where
officials have purported to correct flawed procedures by adopting inadequate,
superficial revisions, an affirmative injunction may actually better serve the
state’s interest, because it provides concrete requirements and potentially expedites the creation of a constitutional procedure with which the state can resume
executions.
There are two especially feasible lethal injection affirmative injunctions: (1)
the one-drug protocol and (2) anesthesiologist monitoring. The one-drug protocol would replace the current three-drug procedure with a single, massive
dose of a barbiturate like pentobarbital. (Experts agree that pentobarbital is a

305. See Fletcher, supra note 202, at 649-54 (discussing affirmative and negative injunctions).
306. Though affirmative injunctions have been historically disfavored, the distinction
between negative and affirmative injunctions has less practical importance today,
given courts’ willingness to grant affirmative decrees where some injunctive relief
is warranted. Id. at 649-50; see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 225, at 1067-73 (describing new “experimentalist tendency” in courts’ approach to public law remedies). Additionally, to the extent that Baze requires the plaintiff to proffer an alternative, see Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532, the plurality contemplates that a court
finding a violation could affirmatively order that that alternative be implemented.
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better suited barbiturate for lethal injection than thiopental.307) The major advantage of a one-drug procedure is that it would eliminate the possibility of excruciating pain.308 Whereas the barbiturate in the three-drug procedure theoretically anesthetizes the inmate so that he will not suffer pain from the other
drugs, in a one-drug protocol, the barbiturate is the only drug. Even if something goes wrong, the inmate will not experience pain, because barbiturates do
not cause pain. Of course, even a one-drug procedure would need to be properly administered, but the procedure would be much easier to administer and
the consequences of maladministration far less severe. In short, the one-drug
procedure significantly reduces both the chance of error and the pain suffered
in the event of error without requiring many other changes from the state.
Some courts have already recognized the one-drug protocol’s advantages.
The district court in Morales offered it as one of two possible remedies from
which California could choose.309 In Harbison, the trial court faulted Tennessee
for not taking more seriously its own committee’s recommendation of a onedrug procedure.310 And, most recently, an Ohio state court found that Ohio’s
three-drug procedure failed to comply with the state’s statutory requirement
that lethal injection be completed “quickly and painlessly” and ordered that the
state’s “protocol employ the use . . . of a single, anesthetic drug.”311
A switch to the one-drug procedure would also not unduly burden states.
States would have to make minor adjustments to accommodate the one-drug
approach, but in so doing, they would greatly simplify executions. Such a
307. See, e.g., Hankins v. Quarterman, No. 4:04-cv-875-Y, 2007 WL 959040, at *20
(N.D. Tex. 2007) (citing expert testimony that a long-acting pentobarbital is the
preferred barbiturate in veterinary euthanasia); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d
972, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing pentobarbital as the preferable drug for the onedrug protocol); Amy L. Mottor, Note, Morales and Taylor: The Future of Lethal
Injection, 6 Appalachian J.L. 287, 307 (2007) (discussing the advantages of pentobarbital); Susi Vassallo, Thiopental in Lethal Injection, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J.
957, 960-67 (2008) (discussing the disadvantages of thiopental).
308. See, e.g., Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 879 n.4 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (“No
medical testimony supports the proposition that the one-drug protocol causes
any suffering . . . .”); Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (“[R]emoval of [pancurium
bromide and potassium chloride] from the lethal-injection protocol, with the execution accomplished solely by an anesthetic, such as sodium pentobarbital, would
eliminate any constitutional concerns, subject only to the implementation of adequate, verifiable procedures to ensure that the inmate actually receives a fatal
dose.”); Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 19, at 956 (anesthesiologists arguing
that a large dose of barbiturate poses “no risk whatsoever” of pain).
309. See Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (giving the
State the option of using “only sodium thiopental or another barbiturate or combination of barbiturates in Plaintiff’s execution”).
310.

See Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 896; see also supra notes 265-269 and accompanying text.

311.

Ohio v. Rivera, No. 04-65940, slip op. at 9 (Lorain County Ct. June 10, 2008).
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change would result in a safer, more easily administered procedure that would
probably require less training and practice. Moreover, most states would not
need to change their execution facilities or basic drug delivery systems.312
Notwithstanding these obvious advantages, Baze does somewhat complicate the matter. Although no Justice questioned the central point that the onedrug procedure is painless, some justices did raise concerns about it. Justice
Alito pointed to one commentator suggesting that it is difficult to kill someone
using a barbiturate and that a small percentage of such attempts resulted in
“problems with completion.”313 Three separate opinions also noted that a muscle relaxant or paralytic is often used for lawfully assisted euthanasia in the
Netherlands, thereby suggesting that the inclusion of pancuronium was defensible and possibly even desirable.314
These concerns do not foreclose the one-drug procedure so much as indicate that trial court factual findings would be needed before it could be judicially imposed. Given that the Baze record contained minimal evidence about
the relative merits of the one-drug approach,315 the Justices’ comments on it
were dicta. Moreover, Justice Alito’s concern that a single barbiturate had failed
to kill a tiny percentage of euthanasia patients in the Netherlands is scant reason
to reject this alternative.316 When euthanasia patients fail to die from the administration of a single barbiturate, it is because the drug has been improperly
administered; properly administered, a large enough dose of a barbiturate will
be fatal.317 In effect, Justice Alito is merely pointing out that a one-drug protocol
could be improperly administered. He fails to explain, however, that the threedrug protocol can also be maladministered and with far graver consequences.
He also fails to point out that by removing the second and third drugs, the state
would be simplifying the procedure and minimizing the risk of problems of any
sort. Similarly, he does not note that the largest thiopental dose used in the
Netherlands is often only two grams, and that it is therefore not surprising that

312.

By way of contrast, even though carbon monoxide poisoning would probably be
another painless alternative, see Gaitan, supra note 115, in most states it likely
would require a new airtight facility and therefore probably would be more intrusive and expensive.

313.

Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1541 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring).

314.

Id. at 1535 (plurality opinion); id. at 1541 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1566

(Breyer, J., concurring).
315.

See id. at 1534 (explaining that one-drug protocol was not proposed to state courts
below).

316.

See id. at 1541 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that 5 out of 535 patients woke up).

317.

See, e.g., Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 879 n.4 (“No medical testimony supports the
proposition that the one-drug protocol causes any suffering or that it prolongs the
pronouncement of death.”); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 983 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (noting that execution by anesthetic like pentobarbital need only ensure
that the inmate “actually receives a fatal dose”).
317
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such use was not always lethal.318 Finally, Justice Alito also fails to explain that
were an inmate to survive an initial dose of a barbiturate, the contingency plan
would simply be to administer another dose.319 The possibility that a painless
drug would need to be re-administered in a small fraction of cases is hardly a
sound reason not to use that method to replace an approach that creates a real
risk of excruciating pain.
The Justices’ discussion of the one-drug procedure also glosses over some
important distinctions. In particular, the comparison to euthanasia in the Netherlands is inapposite, because it is a different kind of procedure from lethal injection. Crucially, doctors take part in euthanasia in the Netherlands.320 It is,
therefore, far more likely in the Netherlands that any pain masked by the pancuronium would be detected.321 By way of contrast, laypersons frequently administer American lethal injection procedures, and they are incapable of making such detections. Moreover, even where doctors are present during
executions, they usually watch from an adjacent room and would not be able to
detect pain from that distance. Additionally, Dutch euthanasia does not include
the use of potassium chloride, which is the three-drug protocol’s painful chemical. The use of pancuronium in the Netherlands, therefore, poses far less danger
of masking excruciating pain.
Of course, for a court to impose a one-drug protocol as a remedy, significant evidence of that procedure’s advantages and disadvantages would need to
be developed at trial, and it is possible that problems will become more apparent. But assuming that current experts’ preference for the one-drug protocol
continues to appear well-founded, this alternative offers courts an affirmative
injunction that greatly reduces the risk of pain and simultaneously makes the
state’s job easier.

318.

Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 19, at 954.

319.

Cf. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (holding that it is
not cruel and unusual punishment to attempt to execute a person after the first
execution attempt failed); Alper, supra note 29, at 836 (explaining the second-dose
contingency plan in animal euthanasia).

320. See Agnes van der Heide et al., End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands Under the
Euthanasia Act, 356 New Eng. J. Med. 1957, 1958 (2007) (“In the Netherlands,
euthanasia is defined as death resulting from medication that is administered by a
physician with the explicit intention of hastening death at the explicit request of
the patient.”). Assisted suicide, in which patients self-administer fatal drugs prescribed by a physician, also exists in the Netherlands but is far less common. Id. at
1958-61.
321.

318

Justice Alito also neglects to mention that the same expert he cites to argue that
American doctors lack experience killing people with an overdose of a barbiturate
states in the same article that the use of a paralytic like pancuronium is “completely inappropriate” in executions. Compare Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1541 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (discussing views of Dr. Truog), with Gawande at al., supra note 25, at
448 (Dr. Truog discussing, inter alia, dangers of pancuronium in lethal injection).
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Courts could also order an anesthesiologist to monitor the inmate’s anesthetic depth. This monitoring was what Judge Gaitan initially ordered in Missouri and one of the two options Judge Fogel presented to California.322 The
major advantage of this remedy is that in one step it protects the inmate from
other errors that might occur.323 We know that the three-drug protocol is
painless if the inmate is properly anesthetized but excruciating if he is not.
Various problems discussed above can result in insufficient anesthesia. But if an
anesthesiologist monitors the inmate’s anesthetic depth, then any such problem
can be detected and corrected before the pancuronium and potassium chloride
are injected. The requirement that an anesthesiologist monitor anesthetic
depth, therefore, obviates the need for more intrusive instructions regarding the
various steps of the procedure.
There are, however, some complications. Due to medical ethics, it may not
be easy for some states to find an anesthesiologist or nurse anesthetist willing to
play such a substantial role in execution procedures.324 In fact, the American
Medical Association (AMA), the Society of Correctional Physicians, and the
American Nurses Association have all adopted statements that doctors or
nurses should not participate in executions.325 The sentiments reflected by these
associations, unsurprisingly, make it difficult for states to find willing anesthesiologists. California ran into this problem when the two anesthesiologists who
had agreed to participate in the Morales execution balked after discovering the
significant role they had been assigned.326 Along similar lines, following Judge
Gaitan’s ruling, Missouri insisted (just days after sending out cold-call letters to
some Missouri anesthesiologists) that it “is unable to comply with the Court’s

322. See Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Taylor v.
Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8-9 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006), certifying questions to 457 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 487 F. 3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2047 (2008).
323.

This advantage assumes that the anesthesiologist is competent and actually monitors the inmate’s anesthetic depth, and that he would delay the administration of
the second and third chemicals if the inmate were insufficiently anesthetized by
the thiopental.

324. Most experts agree that a nurse anesthetist would possess the training necessary to
monitor the inmate’s anesthetic depth. See, e.g., Heath Declaration at 15, Walker v.
Epps, No. 07-176 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 22, 2007) (anesthesiologist explaining that anesthesia can be administered by anesthesiologists and Certified Registered Nurse
Anesthetists). For ease of presentation, this Article refers to them collectively as
“anesthesiologists.”
325.

Gawande, supra note 52, at 136; see, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Med. Ethics: Current Opinions with AnnotationS § 2.06 (2005) [hereinafter AMA Code of Med. Ethics].

326. Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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direction to obtain and use a board certified anesthesiologist in its execution
process.”327
While the restraint imposed by medical ethics is a substantial concern, it is
not an insurmountable one. Although many doctors will not take part in executions, such ethics rules are typically not legally binding.328 Doctors, therefore,
can depart from certain ethical guidelines without risking their licenses or other
disciplinary measures.329 As the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
itself puts it, “ethical obligations typically exceed legal duties. In some cases, the
law mandates unethical conduct.”330
From the AMA’s perspective, capital punishment law does mandate unethical conduct. Notwithstanding ethical concerns, many states want a medical
presence during executions. Thirty-five of the thirty-eight death penalty states
allow physician participation in executions, seventeen require it, and only two
(Kentucky and Illinois) explicitly forbid it.331 To protect participating physicians
from license challenges for violating ethics codes, states usually promise anonymity and provide legal immunity for such challenges.332 In fact, in at least one
state with a law permitting physician participation in executions, the state
medical board upheld against a challenge the license of a physician known to
have participated in executions precisely because state law permitted that participation.333 Similarly, in North Carolina, a state court ruled that the North
Carolina Medical Board cannot punish physicians for participating in execu327.

Defendants’ 7/14/2006 Submission at 4, Taylor (No. 05-4173).

328. See, e.g., AMA Code of Med. Ethics, supra note 325, at xv (“The following Principles adopted by the American Medical Association are not laws, but standards of
conduct which define the essentials of honorable behavior for the physician.”).
329. See, e.g., Gawande, supra note 52, at 132. Moreover, while the former president of
the American Society of Anesthesiologists advised anesthesiologists to “steer
clear” of executions, his words are, by his own account, advice only and lack any
binding effect. See Dr. Orin F. Guidry, President, American Society of Anesthesiologists, Observations Regarding Lethal Injection (June 30, 2006),
http://www.asahq.org/news/asanews063006.htm.
330. AMA Code of Med. Ethics, supra note 325, § 1.02.
331.

Gawande, supra note 52, at 151; see also Neil Farber et al., Physicians’ Attitudes
About Involvement in Lethal Injection for Capital Punishment, 160 Archives of
Internal Med. 2912, 2913 (2000) (noting that states involve physicians in various
ways such as providing technical advice, ordering drugs, supervising drug administration, and pronouncing death); Christopher J. Levy, Conflict of Duty: Capital
Punishment Regulations and AMA Medical Ethics, 26 J. Legal Med. 261, 264
(2005).

332.

Gawande, supra note 52, at 136. Although the identities of some doctors like Doerhoff are sometimes discovered anyway, see Kohler, supra note 42, no doctor has
yet lost a license for participation in an execution, see Gawande, supra note 52, at
137.

333.

See Gawande, supra note 52, at 142.
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tions.334 This ruling makes sense. Even if state statutory law incorporates medical ethics’ rules regarding “professional conduct,”335 a more specific statutory
provision allowing physician participation in executions must trump more general ethical rules.336
Indeed, many doctors do not see medical ethics as a bar to their involvement in executions. Studies demonstrate that 25% of physicians would personally perform five or more steps of a lethal injection procedure, and 19% would
be willing to administer the lethal drugs themselves.337 One anesthesiologist
stated at a panel of the American Society of Anesthesiologists that he considered
it an ethical duty to assist with lethal injection because prisoners “are suffering

334.

See N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Board, No. 07-3574, slip op. at 4-5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Div. Sept. 21, 2007) (holding that the medical board improperly sought to
discipline a doctor for conduct “specifically authorized and required by law”).

335.

Many state codes vaguely prohibit doctors’ “unprofessional conduct.” See, e.g.,
Ala. Code § 34-24-360(2) (2007) (stipulating that credential to practice in health
care may be revoked for “unprofessional conduct”); Ark. Code Ann. § 17-95-409
(2007) (same); Del. Code Ann. tit. 24 § 1731 (2008) (same); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38178(23) (2005) (same).

336. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738-39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing “rudimentary” principle of statutory construction that “the specific governs the general”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. Rev. 621, 663 (1990) (describing Scalia’s argument in Jett as mainstream
statutory interpretation).
It is also possible that a doctor’s national certifying board, such as the American Board of Anesthesiology (ABA), could seek to suspend certification for a doctor who participated in executions. Whereas state licensing is required for a doctor to practice medicine in a particular state, board certification is a voluntary
process and is awarded to doctors by a national board in an individual specialty.
See American Board of Medical Specialties, Board Certification Editorial Background 4-5 (Sept. 4, 2007), available at http://www.abms.org/news_and_events/
media_newsroom/pdf/abms_editorialbackground.pdf). However, not all hospitals
require board certification for anesthesiologists wishing to practice at that institution, Outcome Assessment in Advanced Practice Nursing 246 (Ruth M.
Kleinpell, ed. 2001). Additionally, because the ABA’s disciplinary procedures
commence with a referral from a state medical board, see The American Board
of Anesthesiology, Inc., Booklet of Information §§ 5.02, 5.06 (2008), available at http://www.theaba.org/pdf/BOI-2008.pdf, cases like North Carolina Medical Board make it unlikely that the ABA would sanction a doctor whom the State
medical board has not already disciplined. It is therefore doubtful that the hypothetical threat of suspended certification would make it much more difficult for a
state to find an anesthesiologist to participate.
337.

Neil J. Farber et al., Physicians’ Willingness To Participate in the Process of Lethal
Injection for Capital Punishment, 135(10) Annals Intern Med. 884, 884-88 (2001);
see also Denno, Paradox, supra note 28, at 115 (explaining that physicians do participate in executions).
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and I have the ability to help them.”338 Nurses appear even more willing to participate.339 One state nursing board even permitted a nurse in that state to participate in executions so long as he did not actually push the plunger delivering
the drugs.340
It is, therefore, unsurprising that Missouri recently belied its earlier representations that it was impossible to find an anesthesiologist to take part in its
lethal injection procedure and represented that it has found one.341 Assuming
that this anesthesiologist is competent and will in fact monitor the inmate’s anesthetic depth and intervene if necessary,342 this development is significant, effectively setting a new standard of care for lethal injection. Moreover, other
states could solicit this same doctor’s assistance for their own procedures.343 Of
course, this remedy would not be available in Kentucky and Illinois, which forbid physician participation, but those states are in the significant minority.344
Where available, this remedy is simple and un-intrusive. It permits a state to
keep the same procedure but for the addition of one safeguard.345 And, in the
grand scheme of things, it also would not be terribly expensive.346
338.

Clinical Forum: Medicalizing Executions Places Anesthesiologists on Slippery Slope,
ASA Daily News 2006, Oct. 15, 2006, available at http://www.asadailynews.com/
Sunday.html.

339. See, e.g., Brown v. Beck, 445 F.3d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting the participation
of a nurse in North Carolina’s procedure); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972,
979 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting the same in California); Evans v. Saar, 412 F. Supp.
2d 519, 525 (D. Md. 2006) (noting the same in Maryland); Taylor v. Crawford, No.
05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *1-3 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (noting the same in
Missouri).
340. Gawande, supra note 52, at 147.
341.

See Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Compelling Discovery at 3, Clemons v.
Crawford No. 07-4129 (W.D. Mo. May 1, 2008).

342. The state’s filing announcing the development was vague on the details. See id.
343. It is not uncommon for personnel participating in one state’s execution procedure to join another state’s team. Dr. Doerhoff, for example, participated on the
federal and Arizona lethal injection teams even after Judge Gaitan had barred his
participation in Missouri. See Kiefer, supra note 255; Weinstein, Doctors Barred,
supra note 255.
344. See, e.g., 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/119-5(d-5) (West 2008) (“The Department of Corrections shall not request, require, or allow a health care practitioner licensed in
Illinois, including but not limited to physicians and nurses, regardless of employment, to participate in an execution.”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.220(3) (West
2008).
345. Of course, states with multiple, serious problems with their procedures should
correct them, but the addition of an anesthesiologist would not require as close
judicial scrutiny of each of those steps.
346. See infra notes 368-373 and accompanying text.
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While there is much to be said in favor of this alternative, Baze again presents an obstacle. Even though ethical guidelines typically lack binding authority, the Baze plurality and Justice Alito’s concurrence effectively treated them as
mandatory.347 The justices overstated the case. First, Baze considered the protocol in Kentucky, one of only two states that have barred physician participation.
Its comments on this topic, then, should be considered dictum in the thirty-five
jurisdictions that permit physician involvement. Second, while the majority of
the medical establishment does oppose physician involvement in executions,
some doctors obviously are willing to participate.348 Third, as North Carolina
Medical Board demonstrates, medical associations’ ethical opinions cannot
trump contrary state law, and states, with court assistance, also shield their execution team members’ identities from the public.349 In short, an anesthesiologist’s participation is a feasible remedy that would cure most of the three-drug
protocol’s dangers with little intrusion into the state’s affairs.350
2.

Negative Injunctions

Even if there are good reasons to impose an affirmative injunction, courts
are often reluctant to order a state to take a specific course of action.351 By con347. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1536 (2008) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he American
Society of Anesthesiologists’ own ethical guidelines prohibit anesthesiologists
from participating in capital punishment.”) (internal citations omitted); see also
id. at 1539-40 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that other medical associations’
guidelines prohibit or discourage participation in executions).
348. See, e.g., Gawande, supra note 52, at 150 (describing views of a doctor who knew
AMA position but felt doctors have an ethical obligation to ensure condemned
inmates are without pain in their dying moments); David Waisel, Physician Participation in Capital Punishment, 82 Mayo Clinical Proc. 1073 (2007).
349. See, e.g., Gawande, supra note 52, at 131 (noting that Morales district court agreed
to help California maintain anesthesiologists’ anonymity in response to ethical
concerns). Whether the government should subvert the ethical principles of
medical associations is, of course, another matter. See id. at 152 (arguing that society is worse off from such subversion); Jonathan I. Groner, The Hippocratic Paradox: The Role of the Medical Profession in Capital Punishment in the United States,
35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 883, 905 (2008) (arguing that the “individual physician
harms his or her relationships with other patients by participating in an execution”).
350. If a court were to order this remedy and the State were to demonstrate that, despite a good-faith effort, it had failed to find an anesthesiologist willing to participate, the court could always order an alternative remedy, such as a negative injunction or the one-drug protocol. Given Missouri’s experience, though, it seems
likely that a state making a good-faith effort would be able to find an anesthesiologist to participate.
351.

See generally Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power
in Environmental Law, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1443-44 (2005) (noting law’s general
preference for negative injunctions prohibiting action over affirmative injunctions
323
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trast, a negative injunction—ordering the state to cease executions until its procedure passes constitutional muster—is usually the preferred remedy, because it
can force constitutional compliance while remaining respectful of the state.352
Such an order would theoretically assure the court of the constitutionally required outcome: either the state must bring its execution procedure into compliance with the Eighth Amendment or it must forgo executions. This option is
the approach chosen by the district court in Harbison, in which the court barred
Tennessee from executing the plaintiff under the existing protocol but left the
door open for a future execution with a revised protocol.353
The negative injunction is an important option, particularly for judges who
want to steer clear of dictating specific measures to the state. It is worth remembering, though, that the efficacy of the negative injunction is less certain in the
lethal injection context, because state officials who failed to design a constitutional procedure the first time around may be unwilling or unable to do so even
under court order. A negative injunction, then, might not give the state official
the guidance needed to genuinely reform the state’s procedure.354 Although officials in states with problems typically have given little care to their procedures,
there is no evidence that any intentionally have designed a dangerous procedure. To the contrary, the finer points of lethal injection fall far outside their
core competence, and, burdened with other responsibilities, they do not give
sufficient attention to the complicated procedure. A negative injunction might
spur better behavior, but it also might merely prompt superficial or inadequate
changes, as in California and Tennessee.355 To this extent, a negative injunction
should be monitored closely by courts, particularly in jurisdictions with especially poor track records.

requiring particular action); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law
Remedies, 79 Geo. L.J. 1355, 1406-08 (1991) (summarizing the competency criticisms of broad injunctive relief in public law litigation); Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass of Bush v. Gore, 11 Wm.
& Mary Bill Rts. J. 343, 380 (2002) (“Instead, [critics of structural reform injunctions] argue, federal courts are limited to issuing negative injunctions that simply
prohibit conduct, [while] affirmative remedies should be the responsibility of the
executive and legislative branches, which are more competent to make policy decision . . . .”).
352.

See Fletcher, supra note 202, at 649 (“The preferred form of injunction is to instruct the defendant not to do what it has been planning or to stop what it has
been doing.”).

353.

Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 903 (2007).

354.

This attitude might seem patronizing but is realistic given some states’ refusal to
seek expert assistance. See supra Section I.A; supra Part III.

355.

See supra notes 261-270.
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3.

Administrative Remedies

Yet another alternative is an administrative remedy through a state’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA). To receive such a remedy, a plaintiff typically must demonstrate that the procedures used to adopt the lethal injection
protocol were inadequate under state administrative law.356 As a formal matter,
this remedy is only available in certain states, though, because some states insulate their executions procedures or correctional facilities from otherwise generally applicable administrative law.357
Still, in those states where such claims are colorable, an administrative challenge provides an important avenue for death row inmates. It also can provide a
theoretical framework for judges who recognize that the procedures are problematic but are reluctant to issue a § 1983 injunction.358 Admittedly, most APA
actions are filed separately from § 1983 attacks,359 so few judges finding problems with state lethal injection protocols are in the position of selecting between
an administrative remedy and an injunction. But even where courts are not
formally presented with APA claims, judges can draw more generally on admin356. See Arnold Rochvarg, How Administrative Law Halted the Death Penalty in Maryland, 37 U. Balt. L.F. 119, 119, 124-25 (2007) (discussing the successful administrative law lethal injection challenge in Maryland).
357.

State statutes exempting DOCs from administrative law are vague enough to allow for conflicting interpretations. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 536.010(6)(k) (West
2009) (exempting “statement concerning only inmates of an institution under the
control of the department of corrections” from the definition of a “rule”); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 4-5-102(10)(G) (2009) (exempting “statements concerning inmates
of a correctional facility”). But, some state courts have read these statutes to preclude APA challenges to lethal injection. See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, No. 07M09-141, 2008 WL 1850585 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that Delaware’s
lethal injection protocol is not subject to state APA); Hightower v. Donald, No.
2007-135682, slip op. at 4 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 16, 2007) (“[T]he promulgation of
these protocols regarding lethal injection by the [Georgia] Department of Corrections are not subject to the requirements of the APA . . . .”); Middleton v. Mo.
Dep’t of Corrections, No. SC 89571, 2009 WL 454279, at *1 (Mo. Feb. 24, 2009)
(holding that an execution protocol is not a rule and is therefore not subject to
the State APA); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 311 (Tenn. 2005) (interpreting Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedure Act not to reach lethal
injection).

358.

See generally Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 06-1436, 2008 WL
4958279, at *7 (Cal. App. Nov. 21, 2008) (declaring lethal injection procedure invalid under California administrative law); Evans v. Maryland, 914 A.2d 25 (Md.
2006) (declaring the same in Maryland).

359. These suits are typically filed separately because many state APA statutes require
that APA suits be brought in state court, while many lethal injection challenges
are brought in federal courts, which typically allow for more discovery. See, e.g.,
Del. Code Ann. tit. 29 §§ 10102, 10141 (2009); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 536.110 (West
2009).
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istrative law principles in reviewing and remedying those procedures. The political process failures contributing to the problem invite a judicial order requiring, at a minimum, transparent procedures, greater political accountability, and
delegation to competent personnel. Since administrative failings by themselves
rarely amount to a constitutional violation, a judge confronted with a § 1983 action will also have to look at the substance of the procedure. But where the evidence suggests real problems, administrative considerations should play a role
in helping the court identify a violation and craft a meaningful, workable remedy.
Courts, in fact, should be well situated to rely on administrative principles
in crafting a remedy. Some judges may be more comfortable ruling on procedural rather than substantive issues involving science or medicine. Similarly, an
administrative remedy—or even a § 1983 injunction suggesting improved administrative procedures—might feel less intrusive to the judge than a traditional negative or affirmative injunction addressing the execution procedure’s
details. Indeed, administrative law issues get to the heart of what is wrong with
many states’ lethal injection protocols. The protocols have been poorly conceived in secret by people who know little about the drugs and who have not
sought help from experts. These are not admirable administrative processes,
and, one would hope, improved governmental decision making would yield
safer protocols.360
B. Remedial Modesty and the Case Against Judicial Deference
This discussion should make clear that workable remedies are more modest
and readily available than courts assume. For many judges, however, fashioning
a remedy is a significant obstacle.361 Courts’ reluctance to engage with lethal injection remedies fall into three general categories of objections: concerns about
intruding excessively on the political branches,362 interrelated concerns about
360. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1959) (arguing that an attention to process is the best guarantor that courts will decide cases based on “neutral principles” and reach good
results). But see Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,”
108 Colum. L. Rev. 1013, 1025 (2008) (arguing that too devoted an attachment to
legal processes “often obscures value judgments about the underlying substantive
policies”).
361.

See supra Section II.A.

362. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (plurality opinion) (warning that
imposing a remedy “would substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in
implementing their execution procedures”); Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d
1037, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“[U]nder the doctrines of comity and separation of
powers, the particulars of California’s lethal-injection protocol are and should
remain the province of the State’s executive branch.”); Lightbourne v. McCollum,
969 So. 2d 326, 351 (Fla. 2007) (stating that the judicial “role is not to micromanage the executive branch in fulfilling its own duties relating to executions”).
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the judiciary’s own institutional capacity,363 and concerns about relying on
street-level subordinates to carry out a judgment. These sources of remedial
concerns are legitimate and common in public law litigation, but they should
carry less weight in lethal injection cases than many other contexts.
1.

Concerns About Intruding on the Political Branches

To the extent courts’ refusal to reach the remedial stage suggests a discomfort with intruding on the political branches, they have not been sensitive to
reasons why judicial intervention in lethal injection actions is more modest
than judicially ordered relief in many other settings. By treating remedial concerns as high hurdles in these cases, courts implicitly exaggerate the extent to
which a remedy would interfere with the internal operations of state institutions. For instance, contrary to some courts’ deferential assumptions,364 intrusion into lethal injection procedures would not interfere in more than a marginal way with day-to-day prison operations. Changes to the execution
procedure certainly would not affect security.365 Lethal injection is a discrete
procedure involving only a few prison employees and one inmate at a time. It
takes place in specially designated rooms removed from the rest of the prison
population. Prison safety, then, would not be impacted by changing the drugs,
or by requiring that a member of the execution team have particular medical
training. Most members of the prison staff, in fact, have nothing to do with execution procedures.
Relatedly, a lethal injection injunction would not divert significant
amounts of money from other government programs or even from within the
prison. A negative injunction requiring only that the state cease executions until
it has improved its procedure would allow the state to determine the most cost
effective way to remedy its procedure. Even an affirmative injunction would

363. See, e.g., Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (warning against “embroil[ing] the courts in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise”); Emmett v. Johnson, 511 F.
Supp. 2d 634, 639 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d, 532 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is not
the office of a federal court to dictate to the Commonwealth of Virginia the precise methodology it should employ in carrying out a lawful death sentence . . . .”).
364. See Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 976, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1998)
(preparing to defer to state officials on security concerns involving viewing the lethal injection procedure absent substantial evidence that a prison regulation was
an exaggerated response by prison officials); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181
S.W.3d 292, 312 (Tenn. 2005) (noting deference owed to prison officials in a lethal
injection case to enable them to manage their “tremendous responsibilities”); cf.
Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (articulating a “unitary, deferential standard for reviewing prisoners’ constitutional claims”).
365. See Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 879-84 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a prison regulation barring public viewing of lethal injection execution procedures prior to actual administration of lethal injection was an exaggerated, unreasonable policy to protect safety and institutional security).
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likely impose only modest cost. For example, a switch to a one-drug protocol
would not noticeably change the cost of lethal injection, as none of the drugs
used or contemplated are expensive.366 If anything, switching to a one-drug
protocol would make things easier for the states, which would only have to buy
one drug instead of three and would no longer have to worry about refrigerating the pancuronium.367
Even the inclusion of an anesthesiologist would not impose excessive costs
on the state, especially when compared to costs imposed by structural injunctions. For example, in Missouri v. Jenkins, the total cost for the educational programs ordered by the district court as part of its effort to desegregate Kansas
City schools exceeded $220 million.368 In Pennhurst v. Halderman, the Court
noted that the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the relevant statute would impose
“massive” financial obligations on the states.369 By contrast, Missouri’s Dr. Doerhoff was paid only $2,000 per execution,370 and Georgia’s execution team’s total compensation (including doctors and other personnel) was $18,000.371 No
state executes enough people for this cost to amount to a sizable annual sum;
even in a state like Texas, which executes more people than any other state,372
these costs would be a small fraction of what the death penalty already costs.373

366. See, e.g., Gawande, supra note 52, at 134 (explaining that drugs used in lethal injection are “cheap and routinely available”); About Implementing Human Euthanasia in NM Animal Shelters, http://www.nmanimalcontrol.com/euthanasia/
HEPP/FAQ.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2008) (noting that average cost of pentobarbital to euthanize an animal would be $1.27); Phyllis Coleman, Man[’s Best Friend]
Does Not Live by Bread Alone: Imposing a Duty To Provide Veterinary Care, 12
Animal L. 7, 16, n.65 (2005) (discussing the low cost of pentobarbital).
367. See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 876-77 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (noting that
the refrigeration of pancuronium is a “con” for retaining the three-drug protocol).
368. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 76 (1995). Jenkins is admittedly a controversial
case, but it provides a striking example of a remedy that asks a good deal of state
and local government.
369. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
370. See Kohler, supra note 42.
371.

Gawande, supra note 52, at 151.

372.

See Adam Liptak, At 60% of Total, Texas Is Bucking Execution Trend, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 26, 2007, at A1 (noting that executions have declined recently in states other
than Texas and that, in 2007, Texas executed twenty-six people and no other state
executed more than three).

373.

Some scholars and state groups have tried to calculate the cost of the death penalty. Illinois State Comptroller statistics, for example, show capital cases costing
an average of $13.5 million per year, expenses “significantly disproportionate to
the cost of processing homicide cases in which state’s attorney does not certify the
case for the death penalty.” Thomas P. Sullivan, Efforts To Improve the Illinois
Capital Punishment System: Worth the Cost?, 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 935, 964-65
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In short, lethal injection is not a very polycentric problem, so an injunction
would be unlikely to have far-reaching public consequences.
2.

Concerns About the Judiciary’s Shortcomings

Courts’ reluctance to reach the remedial stage also stems from their related
sense of the judiciary’s own institutional shortcomings. This concern too carries
less weight in lethal injection than other contexts, especially in light of states’
own failures to engage with their procedures. In other areas, such as prison
condition cases, prison officials can convincingly argue that they understand
security concerns far better than judges, and that judicial deference is therefore
warranted.374 By way of contrast, many state officials do not understand the lethal injection procedure they administer and have not given the matter sufficient attention. Under such circumstances, government does not deserve the
deference it enjoys when it has a genuine expertise over a subject matter.
By contrast, even though most judges also lack training in the relevant science, they will review extensive evidence on the issue. Doing so makes them
better equipped to understand the dangers and potential remedies than most
legislators or unelected, unqualified DOC officials.375 Even taking the judiciary’s

(2007). A New Jersey Policy Perspectives report estimated that the death penalty
since 1982 had cost the State $253 million more than life sentences without parole
would have. See Mary E. Forsberg, N.J. Policy Perspectives, Money for
Nothing? The Financial Cost of New Jersey’s Death Penalty 18 (2005),
available at http://www.njadp.org/forms/cost/MoneyforNothingNoveber18.html;
see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“When all is said and done, there can be no doubt that it costs more to execute a
man than to keep him in prison for life.”); Philip J. Cook & Donna B. Slawson,
The Costs of Processing Murder Cases in North Carolina 78 (1993), available at
http://fds.duke.edu/db?attachment-34-1667-view-301 (“The extra cost per execution of prosecuting a case capitally is more than $2.16 million.”); Glenn L. Pierce &
Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death Penalty in American
Politics, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 711, 719 (1991) (“Each death sentence [in
Florida] is estimated to cost approximately $3.18 million, compared to a cost of
life imprisonment (forty years) of approximately $516,000.”); John Roman et al.,
The Cost of the Death Penalty in Maryland (2008), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411625_md_death_penalty.pdf (stating that
Maryland spends on average $1.9 million more on capital cases resulting in the
death penalty); Rone Tempest, Death Row Often Means a Long Life: California
Condemns Many Murderers, but Few Are Ever Executed, L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 2005,
at B1 (stating that the death penalty costs California $114 million a year above what
it would cost to keep the same convicts incarcerated).
374. See supra note 200.
375.

Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding that
the trial judge’s role as a “gatekeep[er]” of expert testimony is to ensure that the
claimed basis for scientific testimony is valid); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
323 & n.30 (1982) (holding that an institution would be liable if a decision about an
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institutional limitations into account, then, many judges are probably more
likely to engage with the science of the issue than legislators, who are driven by
political considerations and are more likely to delegate the procedure to agency
officials.376 Indeed, even if legislatures designed the procedures themselves, there
would be little reason to defer to their scientific judgment. As one commentator
argues:
[O]ne of the chief reasons for allowing legislatures to make findings of
fact in disputed areas—that they are democratic, representative bodies—seems to have no applicability where issues of pure medical fact
are concerned. Unlike those cases in which so-called social facts are involved, there is (or perhaps should be) no significant political element
to the determination of medical fact. This is a fact-finding domain in
which the interest in public participation and legislatures’ relative institutional competency are at their lowest.377
Finally, it should be re-emphasized that the remedies contemplated in these
cases are usually narrow. They do not require massive reforms from the state;
they do not cost much; and they do not undermine the death penalty itself. Lethal injection plaintiffs can win a safer procedure, but they cannot escape execution—at least not through this litigation. In light of states’ problems with their
own procedures, courts are comparatively well situated to deal with these issues.
3.

Concerns About Relying on Street-Level Bureaucrats

Another potential judicial concern may stem from the perceived hopelessness of relying on street-level bureaucrats to carry out a judicial decree, particularly in the prison setting. Street-level bureaucrats are generally regarded as lowlevel employees, such as prison guards, but, as Professor Lipsky famously observed, they often make the decisions that “add up to agency policy.”378 Some
commentators have emphasized the difficulties of achieving social and structural changes, including prison reform, through street-level bureaucrats.379
involuntarily committed ward’s care was not “made by persons with degrees in
medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training”).
376. See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 Duke L.J. 1169, 1182-87 (2001) (noting that the truthdiscovering value of legislative fact-finding is often undercut by a variety of political pressures); B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right To Make Medical Treatment
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 277, 337, 333-41 (2007) (stating
that there is “little reason to believe that legislatures possess—or exercise—
superior institutional competency in the context of medical and scientific fact”).
377.

Hill, supra note 376, at 339.

378. Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual
in Public Services 3 (1980).
379. See Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional
Census of the 1990s, 5 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 427, 506-07 (1997) (“In all bu330
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However, because lethal injection teams usually consist of only a few people
with defined roles, a judicial order would more likely be followed. In something
like the school desegregation context, or capital punishment more generally,
moral responsibility is so diffuse that most involved are unlikely to see themselves closely connected to the violation.380 But where a small team of people,
each with defined tasks, is putting a person to death, a court order is arguably
more likely to create a culture of accountability and impact the personnel involved.381
Indeed, if anything, the central role played by low-level execution team
members renders the need for judicial involvement more pressing and appropriate. Street-level bureaucrats are less politically accountable than upper-level
managers, so countermajoritarian concerns weigh less heavily than when courts
controvert official agency policies.382 Additionally, and most importantly, given
the proper mandate, higher-level DOC officials might do a better job ensuring
street-level compliance if they knew that the court would not permit executions
without cooperation and if a failure to comply might attract bad publicity.383
reaucracies, the bureaucracy’s mission tends to dwarf competing values” so that
conversations among bureaucrats are “not likely to be the locus of transformative
constitutional dialogue.”); Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 805, 816-20 (1990) (arguing that for prison guards, “[a]ll other institutional goals (such as service delivery,
rehabilitation, and even punishment) are subordinated to and furthered by the
pursuit of order”). See generally Lipsky, supra note 378, at 3 (identifying problems
with street-level bureaucracy).
380. Social psychologists have long studied the diffusion of responsibility and related
concepts like the bystander effect. See Earl F. Martin, Tessie Hutchinson and the
American System of Capital Punishment, 59 Md. L. Rev. 553, 562 (2000)
(“[T]hough the interplay in capital cases between jurors, trial judges, and appellate judges gives the appearance of a system that squarely faces the gravity of its
task, the diffusion of responsibility between these actors enables them, and us, to
avoid having to experience fully the monumental decision to kill another human
being.”); Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. Abnormal & Soc.
Psych. 371 (1963) (suggesting that individuals minimize their own moral agency
to the degree they believe they are simply following instructions).
381.

Cf. Bibb Latané et al., Many Hands Make Light Work: The Causes and Consequences of Social Loafing, 37 J. Personality & Social Psych., 822, 823 (1979) (arguing that, in bigger teams, individuals’ efforts and feelings of responsibility
dwindle).

382. Kreimer, supra note 379, at 506-08. But see Roger A. Hanson, Contending Perspective on Federal Court Efforts To Reform State Institutions, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 289,
303, 317-18 (1988) (suggesting that courts’ inability to control street-level bureaucrats undermines the efficacy of institutional reform and hence judicial legitimacy).
383.

As Professor Ely has explained, on hard issues most elected representatives
“shrewdly prefer not to have to stand up and be counted but rather to let some
executive-branch bureaucrat . . . ‘take the inevitable political heat.’” Ely, supra
331

Article - Eric Berger - 28 - Production - 2009.05.15.doc

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

5/15/2009 1:00 PM

27 : 259

2009

Conclusion
Several remedial options are available to fix lethal injection procedures
without intruding excessively on the states. And yet, despite the significant risk
of pain resulting from many states’ lack of transparency, care, and deliberation,
most courts have assumed that any remedy would be onerous and have declined to find a violation. This restraint is excessive. It considers only the dangers of judicial meddling, not the dangers of judicial abdication.
The institutions in control of lethal injection have proven inattentive, incompetent, and nonetheless resistant to change, and courts are institutionally
well situated to remedy the problem. Indeed, in such circumstances, courts are
often the only institution that can secure necessary change. Professors Denno
and Berman are correct in calling upon the political branches to re-examine
their procedures,384 and, ideally, states will respond to these challenges. Unfortunately, though, some states have chosen to retain the status quo unless forced
to do otherwise.385 Such obduracy and lack of transparency create an “immunity
to political correction”386 necessitating judicial intervention.387
Courts should also take into account the extent to which a remedy may
have far-reaching consequences. When an injunction would affect many
spheres of public life and prove very disruptive to non-parties, courts should be

note 283, at 132 (quoting Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the
Political Process, 84 Yale L.J. 1395, 1400 (1975)). But when courts find fault with
governmental policies, thereby drawing the media’s attention, elected officials are
more likely to get involved to address the problem. See, e.g., Press Release, Office
of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Issues Statement on Lethal Injection
Protocol (May 15, 2007), http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/6237/ (Governor responding publicly to court-identified deficiencies in the lethal injection
protocol).
384. See Douglas A. Berman, Finding Bickel Gold in a Hill of Beans, 2006 Cato Sup. Ct.
Rev. 311, 330-31 (noting disappointment at legislative inaction since Hill); Denno,
Quandary, supra note 28, at 117-23.
385.

See supra Part III.

386. Sabel & Simon, supra note 225, at 1064.
387. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 414 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the more uncooperative the government is in correcting constitutional violations,
the more necessary judicial intervention is); Fletcher, supra note 202, at 637 (concluding that the presumption of illegitimacy for structural injunctions is overcome “when the political bodies that should ordinarily exercise such discretion
are seriously and chronically in default” and that in such cases “judicial discretion
may be a necessary and therefore legitimate substitute for political discretion”);
Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 217, at 1389 (arguing that structural reform injunctions should be “presumptively available when it provides the only effective
remedy for constitutional violations”); Mishkin, supra note 213, at 949-51 (arguing
that institutional decrees are justified when there is a clear constitutional violation
and they are the only available remedy).
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especially wary. But not all public lawsuits involve such polycentric problems.
Accordingly, when a remedy is narrow and creates few subsidiary problems, it
should not be treated like an invasive institutional injunction. These distinctions are especially important when courts’ misperceptions color not just the
scope of remedial discretion but also the content of the constitutional right itself.
Many courts to date have mistakenly assumed that a lethal injection remedy would be overly invasive, but is well within their equitable powers to do a
better job considering these issues.388 Indeed, our system reserves an important
role for courts to oversee the other branches.389 Admittedly, it will not always be
easy to gauge the state’s good faith (or lack thereof) or the degree to which a
problem is polycentric. States in lethal injection cases, for instance, cite even
minor reforms as evidence of good faith390 and, similarly, are likely to cry foul
whenever a court imposes any remedy.391 Nevertheless, although these factors
will not always be easily administered, it is important that they factor into
judges’ deliberations. Given the extent to which remedial concerns color judges’
attitudes towards the merits, courts’ initial survey of the remedial issues should
appreciate the multi-faceted nuances that favor and disfavor judicial intervention. Increased recognition of these issues is, admittedly, only a small step towards correcting the misperceptions that have plagued much lethal injection
litigation, but such a step could help courts guard against a reactionary assump388. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978) (“[S]ince all or almost
all equitable remedies are discretionary, the balancing of equities and hardships is
appropriate in almost any case as a guide to the chancellor’s discretion.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) (“In shaping equity decrees, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary power . . . .”);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“Once a right
and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers
to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies . . . .”).
389. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 48, at 256-57 (James Madison) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan ed., 2001) (arguing that unless these branches of government “be
so far connected and blended, as to give to each a constitutional control over the
others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free
government, can never in practice be duly maintained . . . .” and that, if left unchecked, the legislature will extend “the sphere of its activity, and draw[] all power
into its impetuous vortex”); Scott D. Gerber, The Court, The Constitution, and the
History of Ideas, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1067, 1082 (2008) (citing Federalist No. 48 to argue that judicial review imposes an important check on the political branches that
is necessary in a system of separation of powers).
390. Cf. Jones v. McAndrew, 996 F. Supp. 1439, 1450-51 (N.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that
defendants’ good faith efforts to revise the electric chair protocol following
botched execution demonstrated lack of deliberate indifference).
391.

See, e.g., Defendants’ 7/14/2006 Submission of Proposed Protocol at 11, Taylor v.
Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (arguing that
the court’s remedy is “much broader than necessary”).
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tion that any action requesting a public law injunction necessarily would require something intrusive and far-reaching.
Additionally, attention to these issues can help judges clarify when and why
they should engage in self-restraint. Judicial restraint is an important constitutional value that quite appropriately arises at various stages of a case. When
courts appeal to these values, however, they often do so as if restraint applies
identically when determining the right and when issuing a remedy.392 But judicial restraint seems less appropriate when a court with jurisdiction hears evidence suggesting a constitutional violation. In such circumstances, excessive restraint can cause the judge to turn a blind eye to a serious infringement of
rights. By way of contrast, at least in the lethal injection context, restraint may
be more appropriate when a court has found a violation and is choosing between various remedies, some more intrusive than others.393 As lethal injection
challenges continue to work their way through the judiciary, courts should
therefore carefully consider the remedial questions at the outset of the case. It
might be unrealistic to expect all courts to dramatically change their approaches
to these cases, but self-awareness can yield substantial reforms.

392. See supra Section II.A.
393. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 217, at 1411 (discussing courts’ imposition of
narrower injunctions in part due to judicial restraint concerns); Sabel & Simon,
supra note 225, at 1019, 1038 (discussing recent developments in constitutional
remedies, including departures from command-and-control regime). In different
contexts, commentators have argued that courts should be less deferential when
formulating a remedy, because, at the remedy stage, it should focus on the harm
suffered by the victims. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public
Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 Hastings L.J. 475, 552 (1999)
(“Deference to the wrongdoer elevates the defendants’ interests to an explicit part
of the remedial calculus, rather than keeping the remedy focused on redressing
the rights of the victims.”); Poser, supra note 109, at 324-25 (“[A]lthough the
Court continues to insist that the scope of the right determines the scope of the
remedy, the separation of the two has resulted in a desegregation jurisprudence
which is currently rooted in the purported limitations on equity rather than the
opportunity of equitable remedies to correct rights violations.”).
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